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"You're Fired!":
The Common Law Should Respond with the
Refashioned Tort of Abusive Discharge
William R. Corbettt
An at will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an
anarchy, and there notfor long-it certainly cannot be suffered in a society
such as ours without weakening the bond of counter balancingrights and
obligations that holds such societies together. Thus, while there may be a
right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, orfor an arbitraryor
irrationalreason, there can be no right to terminate such a contractfor an
unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A diferent
interpretationwould encourage andsanction lawlessness, which law by its
very natureis designed to discourageandprevent.'
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I. INTRODUCTION

Many people are terminated or discharged from employment in the
United States every day.2 "You're fired!" became the catchphrase of a former
2. For example, the number of layoffs and discharges in December 2018 was 1.7 million,
representing 1.1 percent of all workers. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, , U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Job Openings and Labor Turnover - December 2018, (Feb. 12, 2019),
Of
[https://perma.cc/G8P8-J4UG].
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_02122019.pdf
course, many ofthese could not plausibly be characterized as "wrongful" or "abusive." Given the state of
the law in the United States, it would be very hard to estimate the number of alleged wrongful discharges.
But see Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing
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television personality in the U.S. version of The Apprentice.3 Although some
people may have been entertained,4 albeit somewhat perversely and
sadistically, by a person with authority proclaiming employment termination
to subordinates, termination from employment is far from a joking matter in
the real world beyond "reality television."
Employment is a matter of great significance in the United States.
Termination ends gainful employment and potentially diminishes future
income, jeopardizes standard of living and financial security, and sometimes
ruins careers. The financial benefits of employment in the United States are
not limited to salary or wages. Health care coverage and retirement plans
often are linked to one's job; thus, a person without a steady job may face
difficulties in obtaining and maintaining adequate health insurance6 and/or
adequately funded retirement savings plans.' Because of employees'
dependence on employers for such benefits, "the risk of losing a job is
significant over and above the loss of a paycheck."' This extensive degree of
financial dependence of employees on their employers does not exist in
nations that have free-standing safety nets and coverage plans.' Beyond the
multi-faceted financial difficulty created by job loss, discharge from
employment can damage the physical and mental health"o of the person who
American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 348 n.6 (2014) (estimating that employers have
terminated perhaps as many as 150,000 employees without cause in a year as early as 1983 and citing
sources).
3. Now-President Donald Trump even sought to trademark the phrase. See Martin Wolk, 'You're
2004),
UNBCNEWS.COM
(Mar.
30,
could
become
Trump
trademark,
fired!'
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4557459/ns/business-usbusiness/t/youre-fired-could-becometrumptrademark/ [https://perma.cc/ZF2R-Y4MT]. His effort failed. See Eric Dash, 'Fired'Topped by 'Hired'

At

the

Trademark

Office,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Aug.

30,

2004),

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/30/business/fired-topped-by-hired-at-the-trademark-office.html

[https://perma.cc/M974-5L7L].
4. I vividly recall visiting the NBC studios in New York City during the height of popularity of
The Apprentice. The paraphernalia for sale in the gift shop was dominated by coffee cups, tee-shirts, and
other items imprinted with, "You're fired!" I am ashamed to admit that I bought some tee-shirts to give
out as best-course-grade prizes in my Employment Law and Employment Discrimination classes. It
seemed amusing at the time. Now, as I write this Article, it seems less so.
5. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 346 n. 1. (citing sources regarding the estimated
lifetime loss of earnings caused by termination).
6. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of PersonalResponsibility? Health Savings
Accounts and the Future ofAmerican Health Care,36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 540 (2005); Michael J.

Zimmer, Inequality,IndividualizedRisk, andInsecurity, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1, -20, 24 (2013).
7.

See Zimmer, supra note 6, at 21-24.

8.

Id. at 24.

9. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 433,
434 (2010) (stating that "[m]ore than other developed nations, the United States relies on private promises
to assure health and retirement security ... . These promises involve 'employee benefits."').
10. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive
Dissonance, 60 Mo. L. REV. 89, 134 n.187 (1995). A pithy quote makes the point about the devastating
effects of being fired: "It's a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it's a depression when you lose
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loses a job because many Americans identify so closely with their jobs" It is
not an overstatement to say that termination from employment places in
jeopardy many of the key elements of an American's citizenship, 2 and seen
in this way, abusive terminations injure society at large.1 3 Termination
deprives a person of one job and generally makes it more difficult to get
another job.'4 Consider, for example, the issue of discrimination against the
unemployed-the view that one must have a job in order to be considered for
a job vacancy.'
In spite of the potentially devastating effects of termination to
individuals and to society, the law of the United States generally accords
employers the discretion to discharge employees for good or bad reasons

yours." The original source of the quote is a bit murky; it has been called an economists' joke and
attributed to President Harry Truman. Harry S Truman, in OBSERVER, April 13, 1958; Richard A. Posner,
When Does a Depressionor a Recession End?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2009). Although the quote often
is attributed to President Ronald Reagan, he actually borrowed and modified the quote to make a different
point to his political advantage: "A recession is whgn your neighbor loses his job. A depression is when
you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his." Jessica Ramirez, Economy: Are We in a
Recession or Depression?,NEWSWEEK (Oct. 15, 2008).
I1.

See, e.g., PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 49 (1990) (positing that a person's

job "is valuable both because it generates the earnings which probably constitute the major financial
support for the worker and his family, and because work is so important to the personal identity and sense
of self-worth of the employee"); Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinalCamouflage: Understanding
the Development of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH L. REV. 719, 719 (1991) (observing that Americans
are often said to "describe themselves in terms of the jobs they hold"); Michael S. Knoll, Perchanceto
Dream: The GlobalEconomy andthe AmericanDream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (1993) ("For many
Americans much of their identity is tied to their jobs and to their ability to provide for their families.").
12. Professor Matthew Finkin succinctly chronicles the transition in the United States from an
economy dominated by independent producers to an economy dominated by financially dependent
employees. MATTHEW W. FrNKIN, AMERICAN LABOR AND THE LAW: DORMANT, RESURGENT, AND

EMERGENT PROBLEMS 3-15 (2019). Professor Finkin joins others in arguing that holding a job is a crucial
attribute of economic citizenship. Id. at 97. Indeed, it was the idea that employers possess the power to
end this crucial attribute of citizenship that prompted Professor Lawrence Blades to propose the tort of
abusive discharge in his influential article in 1967. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs.
IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1404 (1967) (discussing the "threat to individual freedom posed by employer power").
13. Professor Blades, in proposing the tort of abusive discharge, noted the constitutional limitations
imposed on governmental employers, such as restrictions on firing employees for exercising their rights
under the First Amendment. See Blades, supra note 12, at 1431-32.
14. It is common practice for prospective employers to ask for employment history on applications
and to ask applicants to explain reasons for separation from priorjobs. On the phenomenon of "scarring,"
see J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal RegulationofEmployment Reference Practices,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 147
(1998) ("Scarring occurs when employers rely on labor market signals, such as prior employment history
or employment references, to deny ajob to someone who could be profitably employed.").
15. See, e.g., Hope Delaney Skibitsky, Note, Jobless in America, DiscriminationAgainst the
Unemployed and the Efficacy ofState and FederalProtectedClass Legislation,66 RUTGERS L. REV. 209
(2013). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has conducted hearings on the issue of
discrimination against the unemployed. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC to Examine Treatment of
Unemployed Job Seekers (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-14-1 I a.cfm
[https://perma.cc/SQJ4-2QJZ].
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under the employment-at-will doctrine.1 6 Even with that default rule,
however, some firings just seem to be so bad, unfair, arbitrary, or abusive
that they should fall beyond the pale of what is permitted by law without
redress." Indeed, there are exceptions to employment at will in U.S. law, all
of which may be grouped under the umbrella term "wrongful discharge," in
the sense that they are legal bases for seeking redress for terminations
notwithstanding the default rule of employment at will.'" Among the
exceptions, there are a multitude of federal, state, and local statutes or
ordinances that prohibit terminations for certain reasons or under certain
circumstances. ' The common law, through contract and tort law, also limits
employers' prerogative to fire employees, but the common law has proven
much more problematic, incoherent, and uncertain than the statutory
exceptions.2 0 First, although there are a variety of contract and tort doctrines
that ostensibly limit employment at will, none actually imposes significant
limitations on employer prerogative in that plaintiff employees rarely recover
under the various common law theories.2 While it is true that plaintiffs are
more likely to recover for wrongful terminations in some states than in others,
depending on the particular state's adherence to a strong version of
employment at will and the statutory and common law exceptions available
in that state's law, discharged employees do not fare well in the run of
termination lawsuits.22 Second, beyond the paucity of employee recoveries
under the various common law theories, the common law is not easily
comprehensible or applicable.23 For example, it is difficult to identify a
consensus understanding of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing,2 4 and there are many different understandings and iterations of the
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (WDVPP).2 5 It is
unsurprising that contract law is ineffective at providing terminated

16.
17.

See infra Part II for discussion of the employment-at-will doctrine.
See, e .g., Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Dischargeand the Searchfor Third-PartyEffects, 74

TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1943 (1996) ("Even in the rough-and-tumble world of the at-will workplace, some
injustices cry out for a judicial remedy.").
18.

See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge:A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN.

L. REV. 517, 519 (2004) (defining and using "wrongful discharge" in this broad sense).
See infra Parts IV & V.
20. See infra Parts IV & V; see generally J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment andthe Common
Law: A Modest Proposalto De-MarginalizeEmployment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 2, at 445 (describing the low probability of employees
winning employment cases but the potential for large recoveries if victorious); Mark P. Gergen, A
GrudgingDefense ofthe Role ofthe CollateralTorts in Wrongful TerminationLitigation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
19.

1693, 1726-37 (1996).
22.

See sources cited supranote 21.

23.

See infra Parts IV and V.

24.

See, e.g., Peck, supra note 11, at 739-43; Bird, supra note 18, at 543-50.
See, e.g., Parkersupra note 20, at 355-56.

25.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OFEMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

68

Vol. 41:1

employees redress, given that the employment-at-will doctrine fits
principally under contract law,26 describing the default rule for duration of an
employment agreement and absence of a good-cause limitation on
termination. Tort law, on the other hand, could have developed in a way that
would have provided a meaningful limitation on employer prerogative to
terminate. So far, it has not. This Article seeks to change that result.
I have argued that we need a reinvigorated2 7 common law of the
workplace to augment the burgeoning body of employment law statutes,
regulations, and ordinances at the federal, state, and local levels. More
specifically, I have argued for more robust tort theories to be developed and
brought to bear to protect workers' rights and interests. This is the
wheelhouse of tort law-recognizing duties to avoid inflicting potentially
grave personal, property, economic, and relationship28 damage without a
justification.2 9 For example, I argued for modification and development of
the tort of invasion of privacy and the defenses associated with it to provide
more protection of workers' privacy interests and redress for violations of
those interests in a world in which information technology increasingly is
eroding privacy in the workplace and beyond.30 As a response to bad, abusive
terminations (particularly terminations involving women), I proposed
application of a stronger version of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IED")." Furthermore, I argued that the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy ("WDVPP") could be
reconceptualized and deployed to provide greater protection of workers'
autonomy rights and interests.3 2
In this Article, I build on my theme of arguing for a more robust common
law of employment through innovations in tort law by proposing a
reconceptualization of the tort theories that have been applied to terminations
by recognition of a refashioned tort of abusive discharge. Professor Lawrence
Blades's proposal of the tort of abusive discharge in his important 1967

26.

See infra Part V.B.

27. See infra Part IV. The 1970s and 1980s were a time of active experimentation and development
in many state courts-o much so that commentators predicted the demise of employment at will. To
borrow immortal words of Mark Twain, "The reports of [employment at will's] death are greatly
exaggerated."
28. See Peter Linzer, The Decline ofAssent: At- Will Employment as a CaseStudy ofthe Breakdown
ofPrivate Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 390 (1986) (discussing Leon Green's work on expansion of
tort law to relational injuries).
29.

See infra PartV.

30.

William R. Corbett, The Needfor a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L.

REv. 91 (2003).
3 1. William R. Corbett, An OutrageousResponse to "You're Fired!"92 N.C.L. REV. ADDENDUM
17 (2013) [hereinafter, Corbett, An OutrageousResponse].
32. William R. Corbett, FindingA Better Way Around Employment at Will: ProtectingEmployees'
Autonomy Interests Through Tort Law, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 101 (2018).
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article has not been fully realized in the case law recognizing and developing
the tort of WDVPP. That nebulous and vexing tort, recognized in different
versions in various states, has proven largely impotent in providing a
recovery for discharged employees. 33 Commentators' attempts to explain the
development of the tort, although helpful, provide little concrete guidance,34
and in my view do not move us toward a tort theory that can be reliably used
to provide relief for truly bad terminations. IIED also has been applied to
terminations, but its application has been even less efficacious than that of
WDVPP.3 ' A tort is a terrible thing to waste. The tort theories applicable to
wrongful discharge should be made both effective and coherent. Given the
interests at stake and the extreme employment action at issue, 6 it seems
worthwhile to have a viable tort theory. Humbly, I attempt to take on the
mantle of Professor Blades and propose a blending of WDVPP and IIED to
create a refurbished hybrid tort 7 of abusive discharge.3 8

33.

See infra Part V.A.

34.

See infra Part V.B.

See infra Part V.C.
36. Termination or discharge has been referred to as the capital punishment of employment. MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998); Paul
Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: The Handbook Exception to Employment-At-Will, 4
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 231, 248 & n.59 (2000). 1 do not argue for the tort that I propose to be
extended to other adverse employment actions. Although there are good arguments for such an extension,
I do not advocate such an extension because I prefer to propose an incursion and limitation on employers'
prerogative regarding the most substantial and significant adverse employment action. Courts are reluctant
to oversee employers' personnel decisions even on the matter of termination. To subject all disciplinary
actions to court review would be to make courts super personnel boards and to impinge too much on
employer operational prerogative. Cf Blades, supra note 12, at 1406. The Restatement takes the position
that constructive discharge is covered by the tort, but it does not take a position on extending the tort to
other wrongful discipline. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
35.

37. Professor Anita Bernstein's insightful analysis on how new torts are made probably would not
presage that my proposal will be successful, but I hope to improve the odds by presenting abusive
discharge not as a new tort, but as a blending and repackaging of two torts that have been applied to
terminations for over halfa century. Moreover, I trace the lineage of this refashioned tort back to Professor
Blades's highly regarded article. Thus, there is nothing novel here, and I am not really the creator of the
proposed tort. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539

(1997).
38. Why "abusive discharge" rather than "wrongful discharge" or some other moniker? First,
"wrongful discharge" does not meaningfully and effectively distinguish the tort from wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy. The reconceptualized tort should not be handicapped by the case law and
analytical baggage that has enervated the public policy tort. See infra Part V.A. Second, I am trying to
return from the ineffective tort theories applied to terminations today to a broader tort, similar to that
proposed by Professor Blades.
Although the tort I propose is not exactly what he proposed, it is intended to be broader than the
public policy tort and to be supported by the prima face tort rationale relied upon by Blades. See infra Part
V.A. The fundamental concept is that the tort will permit recovery when an employer abuses the right
bestowed by employment at will--to discharge without a job-related reason. The concept is similar to the
civil law tort doctrine of abuse of rights. Although that doctrine means different things in different civil
law jurisdictions, generally it prohibits one who holds a right from exercising it against the interests of
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I name the proposed tort "abusive discharge" rather than "wrongful
discharge" or some other moniker for a couple of reasons. First, "wrongful
discharge" does not meaningfully and effectively distinguish the tort from
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The reconceptualized tort
should not be handicapped with the case law and analytical baggage that has
enervated the public policy tort.39 Second, I am trying to return from the
ineffective tort theories applied to terminations today to a broader tort, similar
to that proposed by Professor Blades. Although the tort I propose is not
exactly what he proposed, it is intended to be broader than the public policy
tort and to be supported by the prima face tort rationale relied upon by
Blades.4 0 The fundamental concept is that the tort will permit recovery when
an employer abuses the right bestowed by employment at will-to discharge
without a job-related reason. The concept is similar to the civil law tort
doctrine of abuse of rights. Although that doctrine means different things in
different civil law jurisdictions, generally it prohibits one who holds a right
from exercising it against the interests of society or for the purpose of injuring
another. 4 1 Whereas Blades framed his tort based on wrongful motives, I
would include wrongful motives and, borrowing from intentional infliction
of emotional distress, egregious terminations that should not be tolerated by
society. Terminations that are simply unfair would not be actionable under
the tort I propose because such a broad standard of liability would eviscerate
employment at will, and such a proposal would be futile because neither our
legislatures nor our courts are willing to abandon employment at will. What

society or for the purpose of injuring another. See generally Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old

Principle,A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002).
Louisiana, as a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, recognizes the abuse-of-rights doctrine.

See, e.g., Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4h Cir.), writ denied, 522 So.
2d 571 (La. 1988). However, because Louisiana has fully embraced the common law doctrine of
employment at will, abuse of rights has not been an effective theory for terminated at-will employees. See

id.; Walther v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1988). Professor Perillo has suggested that
American law does implicitly recognize the abuse of rights doctrine, and WDVPP is one manifestation of
that recognition. See Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse ofRights: A PervasiveLegal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 5457 (1995). I am grateful to Professor Matthew Finkin for suggesting consideration of the abuse-of-rights
doctrine.
39.
40.

See infra Part V.A.
Id.

41.

See generallyMichael Byers, Abuse ofRights: An Old Principle,A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J.

389 (2002). Louisiana, as a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, recognizes the abuse-of-rights

doctrine. See, e.g., Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ
denied, 522 So. 2d 571 (La. 1988). However, because Louisiana has fully embraced the common law
doctrine of employment at will, abuse of rights has not been an effective theory for terminated at-will

employees. See id.; Walther v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1988). Professor Perillo has
suggested that American law does implicitly recognize the abuse of rights doctrine, and WDVPP is one
manifestation of that recognition. See Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse ofRights: A PervasiveLegal Concept, 27
PAC. L.J. 37, 54-57 (1995). l am grateful to Professor Matthew Finkin for suggesting consideration of the
abuse-of-rights doctrine.
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courts may be willing to do is to impose a more significant limitation on
employment at will, reflecting societal values regarding the importance of
employment, and to adopt a tort theory that provides a more cogent analysis
for the types of cases for which they permit recovery.
I do not presume that my proposal for a refurbished tort theory
applicable to terminations is a panacea for the insecurity and hardships
workers face because of employment at will. A more comprehensive solution
could be states enacting wrongful discharge statutes, but so far only one state
has done that, and no others seem likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, I recognize that employees face a number of obstacles to
recovering in private lawsuits based on common law theories, including
securing adequate representation and often being bound to arbitration.42
However, many of these obstacles also apply to some extent to many
statutory claims. Thus, a more robust tort theory is not a complete, perfect,
or necessarily even the best, solution to the employment insecurity faced by
most workers. Nonetheless, incremental improvement is worthwhile.
Society, employees, and the law would be better served by a new tort theory
that is cogent, that provides some prospect for recovery, and that openly
declares a societal value that some terminations are intolerable to society than
by the current tort theories applied to terminations. Moreover, proposals for
incremental improvements in the law can spark larger changes by starting a
discussion and provoking a reassessment of the existing law. Professor
Blades's proposal in 1967 played a role in spurring a period of creative and
energetic development of common law. That common law development, in
turn, played a role in the proposal and enactment of legislation. Admittedly,
the employment law landscape has changed since the 1970s and 1980s, but
it is possible that common law innovation again could spark a reassessment
and adjustment of employment at will. Indeed, employment at will could be
more vulnerable today than it was in 1967.43 At a minimum, tort law applied
to a matter as important as termination from employment can be and should
be better than it is.
Part II discusses employment at will and exceptions to employment at
will. Part III considers American exceptionalism regarding the law of
employment termination and proposals to end the rogue status of the United
States by statutorily abolishing or limiting employment at will. Part IV
42. Professor Clyde Summers was not an advocate for the common law theories that emerged during
the 1970s and I 980s. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 472 (1992) ("Common law remedies for wrongful
discharge, however 'wrongful' is substantively defined, have little to commend them.") [hereinafter
Summers, Effective Remedies].
43. It is difficult to assess this proposition. There are many more exceptions to employment at will
than there were in the 1970s and 1980s. It is not clear whether that makes employment at will more or less
susceptible to change.
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discusses the common law limitations on employment at will and the features
of contract law that prevent it from providing a credible check on
employment at will. Part V discusses the inadequacy of existing tort law to
provide appropriate limits on employment at will. Part VI proposes a
refurbished tort of abusive discharge fashioned largely from the tort theories
of IED applied to termination and WDVPP. I conclude that the time has
come for courts again to develop a common law restriction on employment
at will-the tort of abusive discharge.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EXCEPTIONS
A. "ForGoodReason, Bad Reason, or No Reason at All"

The United States is known in the world as a hire-and-fire society." The
signature4 5 feature of the nation's employment law is the employment-at-will
doctrine, which provides that employers may fire employees "for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all." 46 Imagine that-terminating an
employee for no reason at all!47 Beyond the legal right to fire for any reason
at any time, employers generally also may fire most at-will employees
without following procedures, without giving notice, and without providing

44.

Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation andIts Ordering at Century's End: Reflections

on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1999) ("Foreign observers
typically characterize [the United States] as a 'hire and fire' society. . . .").
45. "Signature" in the sense that we have it, and no one else does-at least not the extreme version
that we do. See infra Part III.A. The Restatement of Employment Law recognizes the centrality of
employment at will to the employment law of the United States. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

LAW § 2.01 (2015).
46. See, e.g., Enquist v. Oregon Dep't ofAgric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008); Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R.,
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruledonothergrounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
Many sources are cited for this famous or infamous statement of employment at will.
47. The last part of this statement of EAW that employers may fire for no reason at all appears
hyperbolic. People do not do anything for no reason at all. Professor Weiler contends that employers do
not wish to fire employees without a good, job-related reason because of the losses that result to the
business. See WElLER, supra note 11, at 59. Actually, however, "no reason at all" is the part of the
statement that best explains how employment at will operates in litigation. For termination of at-will
employees, employers are not required, when sued for discharge, to provide a reason for the termination.
If the former at-will employee claims that she was terminated for an illegal reason, the initial burden of
production is on the plaintiff to present evidence of the reason. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful

DischargeProtectionsin an At- Will World, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1655, 1669-70 (1996) (stating that "[p]roof
of a wrongful discharge requires the plaintiff to prove a particular unlawful motive on the part of the
employer, of whom the law otherwise requires no reason at all"); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law

ofEmployment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 645-46 (1988).
Consider, for example, the McDonnell Douglaspretext analysis for disparate treatment employment
discrimination claims. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the
burden of production shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the adverse employment action. See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS:
THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2018).
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severance pay.4 8 It is important to recognize that, while employment at will
is thought of as the basic and default employment termination law of the
49
United States, employment at will is not federal law; it is state law, with
5 2
5
forty-nine states adhering to it,5 0 most by case law ' but some by statute.
The genesis of employment at will in the United States has been fertile
ground for discussion and debate among scholars. Rather than going into
extensive detail in attempting to clarify the origins of the doctrine, I offer a
few observations. Poor, beleaguered Horace Gay Wood, a lawyer and treatise
writer who has become the Aaron Burr of employment law," bears the brunt
of criticism from employment-at-will detractors for pronouncing
employment at will in his treatise on master and servant in 1877 and citing
authority that did not clearly support the rule.5 4 While Mr. Wood undeniably

48.

See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, MainstreamingEmployment Contract Law: The Common

Law Casefor Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2014) ("Although it is
generally thought of and treated as a single rule, employment at will is a multipart doctrine from which
three distinct principles can be derived .... .").
49. It is not easy to classify employment at will. It may be considered a doctrine, a rule, or an
evidentiary presumption. It seems most accurate to characterize it as an evidentiary presumption-a
rebuttable presumption that applies unless and until the plaintiff presents evidence that she had an
employment agreement that differs from the default at-will arrangement. The Restatement labels it a
"default rule" of contract law and a "rebuttable presumption." See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 2.01 cmt b (2015); see also Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1522; David J. Walsh & Joshua L.
Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful DischargeDoctrines:Up-Date, Refinement, andRationales, 33
AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 668 (1996). However, courts in most states apply such a strong version of the
presumption that it approaches a rule of substantive law. See, e.g., Parker,supra note 20, at 349-52.
50. Montana is the lone state to have enacted a statutory abrogation of employment at will-the
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, discussed below. See infra Part III.B. Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands also do not follow employment at will. See generally Jorge M. FarinacciFem6s, The Searchfor a Wrongful DismissalStatute: A Look at PuertoRico's Act No. 88 as a Potential
StartingPoint, 17 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 125 (2013).
51. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical andEconomic Reassessment of

the Rise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 690 (1994).
52. The Arizona Employment Protection Act states that the employment relationship is contractual
and is presumed to be at will, but can be modified by a writing signed by the parties. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
23-1501 (2019). Georgia and Louisiana courts have recognized statutes as codifying employment at will.

See, e.g., Land v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 203 S.E 316, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §
34-7-1); Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 820 So. 2d 542, 545 (La. 2002) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ART.
2747).
53. Like Burr, who is remembered only for killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel, Wood, a prolific
treatise writer and lawyer, is known almost exclusively for penning the rule of employment at will in his
Master-Servant treatise. See, e.g., Theodore St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 32, 33 (1982)
(describing the at-will rule as having "spr[u]ng full-blown .. . from [Wood's] busy and perhaps careless
pen"). Mr. Wood likely will fare no better in the unlikely event a playwright ever writes a play about
employment at will. See HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (2015).
54. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an
InterjurisdictionalRace to the Bottom ofEmployment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REv. 453, 457 (2008). For
scholars criticizing the work of Wood, see, e.g., J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract

Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); Clyde Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst
UnjustDismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976). There also are defenses of Wood,
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wrote in his treatise that employment at will was the American rule, blaming
(or crediting) that statement for the genesis of employment at will goes too
far." It is true that Wood's treatise was cited as authority for the proposition,56
but it is hyperbole to brand it the origin of the rule.
Given that I am arguing for common law to be modified to place more
substantial limitation on employment at will, it is worthwhile to consider
briefly what forces gave rise to employment at will. Furthermore, it is
appropriate to sketch the defenses of employment at will offered by its
apologists. First, why did employment at will become the law of fifty states
(before Montana defected in 1987)? There are several theories offered to
explain this phenomenon. Three of the principal theories were propounded
by Professors Sanford Jacoby, Jacob Feinman, and Andrew Morriss.1 7 The
theories are more complex, but I offer a succinct and overly simplified
capsule of each. Professor Feinman argued that the courts adhered to the rule
to preserve the power of the capitalist owners of businesses in the face of the
ascent of, and threat posed by, the middle-level managers." Morriss labels
the Feinman theory as "crushing the middle class."59 Professor Jacoby
focused on the historical context of the struggle between employers on the
one hand and stronger labor unions and mid-level managers with relatively
higher social class standing on the other in Britain, yielding a presumed term
contract in the courts. In contrast, the stronger employers and weaker labor
such as Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenanceof "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990). Wood's statement ofthe rule was as follows:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will,
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by
proof. . . [Ilt is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this
respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants.
HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).

55. See, e.g., Peck, supranote I1, at 722. Professor Peck points out that the New York "Field Code"
and other sources stated the rule of employment at will. Id. Professor Morriss has mapped the chronology
of adoption of employment at will in the states and suggested several reasons why the courts adopted it.
See Morriss, supranote 51. Professor Richard Bales, considering the state adoption progression described
by Morriss, opined that "once the first underindustrialized states adopted the rule, other
underindustrialized states would have been compelled to follow suit to remain economically competitive
with the early adopters. Industrialized states would then have been compelled to adopt the rule, as well,
to maintain their competitive advantage in the labor market .... The adoption of the at-will rule by a
handful of underindustrialized states, therefore, precipitated an interjurisdictional race to the bottom."
Bales, supranote 54, at 455.
56. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual
Employees: FairRepresentation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1084 (1984)
[hereinafter Summers, The ContractofEmployment].
57. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the At-Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to
Its Origins as Based in the Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 82 n.43
(1995).
58. Jay M. Feinman, The Development ofthe Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118
(1976).
59. Morriss, supra note 51, at 693.
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unions and mid-level managers with relatively lower class standing in the
U.S. yielded the at-will rule in the courts.60 Morriss calls the Jacoby theory
"social class and weak unions."61 Professor Morriss, examining the
chronology of adoptions of the at-will rule by the various states, rejects the
related theories of Feinman and Sanford and instead posits that the rule was
adopted by courts because it was administratively felicitous for courts that
were (and are) ill-suited to determining employment disputes.62
Regardless of the origin of the doctrine or the reasons for its adoption
and proliferation, employment at will is the default rule in 49 states.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that federal
government employment is at will in the absence of contrary legislation,
although many positions in public employment, both federal and state, do
have procedural prerequisites and/or good cause protection.' Whether
employment at will needs to be preserved in the strong version that exists
throughout the nation65 or it needs to be restricted by further statutory,
regulatory or common developments will be discussed below.66
B. Exceptions-Employees Not Terminable at Will andEmployees at Will
Who Are Not Terminablefor CertainBadReasons
Although employment at will is the dominant principle regarding
employment termination in the United States, it is subject to many
qualifications and exceptions. These exceptions are often viewed as legal
erosions of, or impingements on, employment at will." However, there are
differences in these exceptions that cause me to divide them into two
categories. First, there are employees who simply are not terminable-at-will
employees. They may be made other than at-will employees either by
contract or by statute. Second, there are at-will employees who cannot be
fired for certain bad reasons or under certain circumstances as defined by
either statute (or ordinance) or tort law.

60.

Sanford M. Jacoby, The DurationofIndefinite Employment Contracts in the UnitedStates and

England:An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982).
61.

Morris, supra note 51, at 694.

62.
63.

Id at 695-96.
Enquistv. Oregon Dep't ofAgric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).

64. See generally Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" That Swallows the Exceptions, 11
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 83 (2007).
65. Although employment at will is a strong default principle in 49 states, the strength of
employment at will does vary among the states. For example, states recognize different statutory, contract,
and tort exceptions to employment at will. Moreover, states differ regarding their interpretations of
contract and tort exceptions, such as wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See infra Part V.A.

66.

See infra Part ILA, III.B.

67. See, e.g., Leonard,supra note 47, at 632 (stating that employment at will "has experienced great
erosion").
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1. Employees Who Are Not TerminableAt Will: ContractualandStatutory
Protections
The common law of contracts recognizes employment contracts that are
not at will. Employees are not at will if they have an individual contract or
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides for terms
other than at-will termination, such as a good-cause requirement for
discharge or a specified term of employment. A very small percentage of
workers in the U.S. have individual contracts that vary employment at will."
Collective contracts (collective bargaining agreements) negotiated by unions
almost always vary employment at will and provide good-cause protection.
However, the percentage of employees who are members of unions has been
declining for decades, and now only about ten-and-a-half percent of the
combined public and private sector workforce and just over six percent of
private sector employees are even represented by unions." Plaintiffs who
claim to be other than terminable at will by the terms of an individual or
collective contract sue employers for breach of express or implied contract
terms or file grievances under the procedures established by their collective
bargaining agreements.
Beyond the common law of contracts, there are civil service statutes that
provide good-cause and procedural protections to classified employees in
both federal and state employment." Tenure rules at various levels of
68. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 747 (3d ed. 2005) ("Relatively few workers
have individual written contracts of employment"); Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the
Common Law: Towards a Renewed Prominencefor Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge
Jurisprudence, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 193, 210 (2010) (stating that "[i]n the contemporary American
employment market, employees working under individual work contracts are by far the exception to the
norm, and contract-employees have traditionally been thought of as belonging to a relatively confined
number of positions .... 1").
69. See, e.g., Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Towarda Theory of "JustCause"in Employee
DisciplineCases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594,594-95 ("Virtually every collective bargaining agreement contains
some such limitations. ... [The just cause] requirement is so well accepted that often it is found to be
implicit in the collective agreement, even when there is no stated limitation on the employer's power to
discipline."); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 22 n.1 11 (1988) ("Most collective agreements require 'cause' or 'just cause' for discharge or
discipline. Even in the absence of an express 'just cause' limitation, arbitrators will imply such a limitation
on discharge.") (citing F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652 (4th ed. 1985)).
Summary (Jan. 18, 2019),
70. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm [https://perma.cc/HYS5-7UFC). A somewhat higher
percentage likely is covered by collective bargaining agreements, as unions that are certified as collective
bargaining representatives bargain for the entire bargaining unit and not just members. Union density in
the public sector has been much higher than in the private sector, and that remains so today. Id. It remains
to be seen what effect the Supreme Court's recent decision in Janus v. AFSCMEC 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2478 (2018) (holding that state agency-fee laws regarding public sector jobs are unconstitutional), will
have on public sector union density.
71. See, e.g., Seymour Moskowitz, Employment at Will and Codes of Ethics: The Professional's
Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 33, 46 (1988). Professor Leonard notes an irony regarding the job security
of many civil service employees: "[P]ublic sector employees, whose salaries and benefits are paid from

2020

THE REFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE

77

educational institutions provide protections of the good cause and procedural
varieties. 72

Professor Richard Thompson Ford succinctly summarizes the sources
that change at-will employment: "Employment at will ... sometimes .. . is
superseded by other arrangements, such as civil service rules, union
contracts, academic tenure ....
2. At Will Employees Who CannotBe FiredForCertainReasons or Under
CertainCircumstances:Statutory, Constitutional, andTort Protections
Although they do not render employees other than at will, many federal
and state statutes and local ordinances provide remedies for covered74
employees, including at-will employees, who are terminated7 1 for certain
specified "bad" reasons or without certain procedures being followed before
discharge. First, there is a large body of anti-discrimination statutes and
ordinances at all levels of government prohibiting terminations based on
specified characteristics, such as race, sex, disability, etc. The large body of
anti-discrimination statutes is the most substantial restriction on termination
of at-will employees." Another very large body of statutes and ordinances

taxes extracted from unprotected private sector employees, may have enforceable employment rights due
to federal or state civil service regulations and constitutional protections against arbitrary decision making
by their governmental employers." Leonard, supra note 47, at 647.
72. Mark L. Adams, The Questfor Tenure: Job Security andAcademic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L.
.").
REv. 67, 74 (2006) ("The awarding oftenure thus changes the employment-at-will relationship ...
73. Richard Thompson Ford, Discounting Discrimination: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Proves That
Yesterday's Civil Rights Laws Can'tKeep up with Today's Economy, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 80
(2011).
74. Many of these laws have specifications regarding coverage. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 applies to employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
75. In addition to terminations, most such statutes prohibit other employment actions classified as
adverse employment actions. They do not necessarily reach all negative job actions, as some are
considered too de minimis to merit protection. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis
Discrimination,47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
76. Some commentators have commented on the perception that the combination of at-will
employment and the substantial exception of anti-discrimination statutes creates "differential standards
for termination"-that white men are the least protected at-will employees. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort,
Labor andEmployment Law at the Millennium: A HistoricalReview andCriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L.
REv. 351, 408-09 (2002); Jeffrey Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L.
REv. 89, 140 (2008) (noting "an unfortunate irony that deeming certain characteristics as especially
worthy of protection inevitably fosters resentment from those not sharing those traits"); Estlund, supra
note 47, at 1679 (arguing that antidiscrimination law co-existing with employment at will "contribute[s]
to perverse employer incentives and to divisive tensions between members of 'protected groups,' . . .and
other employees"); Leonard, supranote 47, at 680 (arguing for expansion ofprotection to level the playing
field and afford equality oftreatment). While the anti-discrimination statutes prohibit discrimination based
on any race or color and either sex, the evidentiary requirements may be higher for whites and males
because of the reasonable presumptions flowing from our historical discrimination against African
Americans and women. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004).
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prohibits discharges 77 for specified retaliatory reasons. Every federal
employment statute has an anti-retaliation provision 7 and many state and
local laws do as well, such as some state workers compensation statutes. A
third type of statute that has proliferated in the last two or three decades is
whistleblower statutes. 79 The whistleblower statutes bear the closest
relationship to the tort theory of WDVPP; in fact, one category of WDVPP
is whistleblower claims.so Increasingly in recent decades, however, the need
for whistleblower tort claims has dissipated as more and more whistleblower
statutes have been enacted.' A fourth consideration among federal
legislation is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of
1974.82 Although ERISA is not primarily protection against employment
termination, it creates nonforfeitable rights in benefits, and thus impacts
incentives and expectations of employers and employees regarding job
security/tenure." Finally, there are a variety of other statutes, primarily at the
state level, that prohibit terminations for various reasons, such as an
employee's participation in lawful off-duty activity or pursuit of a certain
lifestyle choice.84
Federal and state constitutions also may provide recourse for terminated
federal or state public employees. Under appropriate fact situations, public
sector employees assert claims pursuant to section 19835 that that they have
been terminated because of their exercise of constitutionally protected rights,
such as rights under the First Amendment.86 State government employees
also may assert claims that their terminations violate rights under their state
constitutions.

The statutes also prohibit other adverse employment actions. See supranote 75.
78. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliationand the Accident ofText, 90 OR. L. REV. 525,
528 (2011) ("All of the other major federal employment statutes either contain explicit prohibitions on
employer retaliation or have been held to prohibit employer retaliation.").
79. Consider, for example, the many federal whistleblower statutes within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statutes, WHISTLEBLOWERS.GOV (Oct. 11, 2019),
77.

https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes [https://perma.cc/3G32-HWM5].
See infra Part V.A.
81. Peter R. Marksteiner, The Flying Whistleblower: It's Timefor FederalStatutoryProtectionfor
Aviation Industry Workers, 25 J. LEGIS. 39, 39 (1999) (citing DANIEL P. WESTMAN, THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE at vii (1991)).
80.

82.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).

83.

See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 633.

84.

See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discriminationin Employment, 24 BERKELEY

J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2003).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
86. See, e.g., Samuel Isacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV. L. REv. 607, 616-17
(1990) (reviewing PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990)). However, the Supreme Court

modified the Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)/Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
analysis in a way that finds protected speech of public employees in fewer cases in Garcetti v. Ceballos,

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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It seems that the statutes have had an effect beyond the situations in
which they actually provide for recovery for terminations. The proliferation
of statutory exceptions to employment at will has given rise to expectations
among both employers and employees that are not consistent with
employment at will-a sense that all employees must be treated fairly in the
matter of termination, described as "a new consciousness and assertiveness
about job security.""
Finally, at-will employees also have used several tort theories to seek
recovery for their terminations: invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing," and WDVPP. Professor Mark Gergen divides the torts into what he
labels as the "collateral torts" applied to termination, on the one hand, and
WDVPP and breach of the covenant of good faith, on the other." The
collateral torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation, were not specifically created for employment and are not applied
exclusively to employment." Neither the collateral torts" nor WDVPP92 has
functioned very well in providing a moderately successful theory of recovery
for plaintiffs suing for employment terminations. Perhaps this is unsurprising
in light of the importance attached to the employment-at-will doctrine.93
This "dazzling and rapidly expanding array" of statutes and common
law theories protecting workers' rights and interests is different from, and
perhaps inferior to, a collective bargaining model.94 This approach has been
characterized as focusing on the individual but not promoting the long-term
employment relationship and as being "adversarial and atomized."" This

87. Leonard, supranote 47, at 634-35.
88. This theory has been treated by some courts as a contract theory and by others as a tort theory,
and the treatment has varied within jurisdictions over time. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 20, at 354; Peck,
supra note 11, at 741-43; West, supra note 69, at 13.
89.

Gergen, supranote 21, at 1698-99.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1694-95 (noting that Texas courts dismiss most such claims at the trial level on summary
judgment and that the majority of jury verdicts for employees are reversed on appeal).
92. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critiqueof the Modern At Will

Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189,247 (1983). There is not much survey data or empirical analysis of plaintiffs'
win-loss rate in WDVPP cases. The oft-cited generalization that plaintiffs do not have a good success rate
in "wrongful discharge" litigation depends on using the term in the broad sense, not limited to WDVPP.
See Estlund, supranote 47, at 1673. However, reading many of the decisions indicates that the doctrinal
uncertainties regarding WDVPP, see infra Parts V.A & V.B, have caused courts to give narrow
interpretations and often deny recovery.
93.

See infra Part III.

94.

See, e.g., Ellen J. Dannin, ContractingMediation: The Impact of Different Statutory Regimes,

17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 109 (1999).
95.

Id.
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patchwork approach also may be criticized for not being coherent or
knowable to employers and much less to employees.96
There is a need for additional protection against abusive and wrongful
termination and redress for discharged employees. This need arises because
the other types of restrictions on employment at will are inadequate. First,
only a small percentage of employees in the United States are represented by
unions and/or covered by collective bargaining agreements. 97 Second,
statutory exceptions to employment at will are specific to particular types of
terminations, such as race-based discharges or terminations based on
retaliation for assertion of protected rights, and almost all efforts to statutorily
abrogate employment at will have failed.98 Advocates of a strong
employment-at-will doctrine undoubtedly will disagree. Others may argue
that the current patchwork of contract law, statutes, and torts adequately
restricts abuse by employers of the prerogative bestowed upon them by
employment at will. I think, however, that many abusive discharges occur
that our society should not tolerate. The many exceptions to employment at
will that the law has recognized support this proposition. For reasons that I
explain below, common law development offers a promising way forward
through the development of a reimagined tort of abusive discharge, fashioned
from the existing torts of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND STATUTORY EFFORTS TO ABROGATE
OR LIMIT EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

A. The U.S. StandsAlone
It often is said that the United States is the only industrialized nation
with a developed body of employment law that adheres to employment at
will. With some qualification, that statement is accurate. 99 The comparison

96. Consider, for example, that it seems likely that many employees do not know the circumstances
under which they can be legally fired. See Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:A Study
of Worker Perceptions ofLegal Protectionin an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 133 (1997);
Peck, supra note 11, at 719 & n..
97. See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part 111.B.
99. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 347 & 348 n.7 (stating that the at-will rule places
the U.S. "in a singular position among most other developed countries" and citing numerous other
sources); see also Befort, supra note 76, at 406 ("The United States stands virtually alone among
industrialized nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against unjust dismissals."); Peck,
supra note I1, at 727 & n.48. While these statements are accurate, a more nuanced examination reveals
that some nations have laws that, while not fully at-will, approach the U.S. law. Israeli termination law is
characterized as at-will. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Principle of Proportionality in Labor Law and Its
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of U.S. termination law with that of other nations that results in a
characterization of U.S. law as clearly inferior in providing employment
security and protection because of the predominance of the employment-atwill doctrine, however, may be too facile. As Professors Estreicher and
Hirsch have demonstrated, a more detailed and nuanced approach to
comparative law considers not just the "law on the books," but also the degree
of enforcement of those laws and the range of remedies available for
violations.o For example, Estreicher and Hirsch argue that although it is
more difficult to win employment claims in the U.S., successful claimants
often recover much larger awards than those in other nations."o' Although
they argue that the big wins may mean the U.S. has a more robust array of
employment protections and remedies, such a system also can be criticized
as a "uniquely American employment law lottery," in which there are rare
big winners.' 02
Employment at will, as the hallmark of U.S. employment law, is both
one of the most reviled and one of the most sacrosanct principles of U.S. law.
While many scholars have railed against the doctrine and called for its
abrogation, some scholars,'0 3 courts, and others defend employment at will
as an important and perhaps indispensable part of U.S. law and the nation's
economy. The chronicle of states' adoption of employment at will and its
proliferation is discussed above, but many have challenged the maintenance
of a rule permitting employers such a broad prerogative in terminating, with
nothing owed to the employee, of one of the most important relationships in
American society. Professor Epstein is one of the strongest and most oftencited academic advocates for employment at will.'" His defense of the

&

Impact on PrecariousWorkers, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 63, 73 (2012). In Israeli law, however,
judicial recognition of good faith duties regarding procedures makes it distinct from employment at will
in the United States. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, RegulatingIndividualEmployment Contracts Through
Good Faith Duties, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J 663 (2011); see also II.B WILLIAM L. KELLER
TIMOTHY J. DARBY, ABA SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. L., INT'L LAB. & EMP. LAWS, 65-32 (4th ed. 2013).
Canadian law requires employers that terminate without good cause to provide a notice period or
severance pay in lieu of notice. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, JustNotice: Re-Reforming Employment

at Will, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1, 49 (2010). Thus, employers in Canada may fire without good cause, but they
may not do it without following any legal prerequisites. Of the twelve nations surveyed by Estreicher and
Hirsch, the U.S. and Canada are the only nations lacking national unjust dismissal legislation. Estreicher
& Hirsch, supra note 2, at 445.
100. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 2, at 351 & 355-56.
Id. at 356.
102. Befort, supra note 76, at 402; see also Gergen, supranote 21, at 1693 ("Wrongful termination
litigation is seen as a big-stakes lottery with outcomes that correlate poorly with the degree of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff or the nature of the defendant's conduct.").
103. Probably the most cited defense of employment at will is Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
101.

Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
104. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 28, at 409 (calling Epstein "the most prominent academic defender
of economic libertarianism").
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doctrine is based principally on a libertarian freedom of contract rationale
with some law and economics rationale blended in.'o5 Epstein argues,
essentially, that the freedom of contract afforded by the at-will rule is
mutually beneficial to employers and employees; "[T]he employer is the full
owner of his capital and the employee is the full owner of his labor, the two
are free to exchange on whatever terms and conditions they see fit." 0 6 As
part of Epstein's broader libertarian and law-and-economics agenda,
government regulation should be limited and the market forces should be left
in play.' 7 A cavalcade of critics have challenged many of the assumptions in
Professor Epstein's defense of employment at will, such as the autonomy and
bargaining power of an individual employee.'s Putting the dubious claims of
autonomy and benefit to the employee aside, the libertarian and law-andeconomics argument contends that permitting employer prerogative aids
market-based outcomes that are economically efficient.' 0 9 In the words of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, employment at will "is central to the free market
economy and 'serves the interests of employees as well as employers' by
maximizing the freedom of both."" " One may question whether employment
at will is so crucial to a robustly performing market-based economy. The
United States is the only nation that adheres to at-will employment."' There
are numerous nations that have generally good economic performance
without employment at will, such as Germany." 2
Perhaps the United States should end its exceptionalism regarding
employment termination and come into conformity with other nations by

105.

See Epstein, supra note 103.

Id. at 955.
107. Epstein views employers and employees as freely choosing at-will terms and concludes that
"freedom of contract tends both to advance individual autonomy and to promote the efficient operation of
labor markets." Id. at 951.
108. See, e.g., Linzer, supranote 28, at415 ("Epstein's several defenses of at-will contracts are based
on incorrect assumptions of both law and fact."); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust
Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1137, 1172 (1989) ("By presenting employment
relations as though they were purely the product of private choice rather than economic power,
Professor Epstein's understanding of at-will employment ignores the consequences of disparities in
economic power and the realities of economic disadvantage.").
106.

109. Epstein, supra note 103, at 951 ("The principle behind this conclusion is that freedom of contract
tends both to advance individual autonomy and to promote the efficient operation of labor markets."); see
also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel L. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination Rules andEconomic Efficiency, 38
EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989).

110.

Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002).

111.

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

112. See, e.g., Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations: The Protectionof
the Employment Bond in GermanandAmerican Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 263 (2000). However,
as comparative law scholars such as Otto Kahn-Freund have cautioned, one must be cautious in asserting
that law that functions well in one society can be transplanted to another society where it will function

well. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supranote 54, at 1138-42.
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enacting a statute or statutes that require good or just cause for termination.
The next Section considers such efforts.
B. Abolishing or RestrictingEmployment at Will by Statutes
1. AbrogatingEmployment at Will by Statutes: ProposalsandResults
Legion are the proposals to bring the United States into conformity with
the rest of the world by enacting statutes that require good or just cause for
termination.1 1 3 As one commentator expressed it, wrongful discharge statutes
have been viewed at various times by commentators as the "deus ex machina
of employment law."ll 4 I will not join the multitude"' who have argued that
the United States should relent from its rogue status and replace employment
at will with a good- or just-cause-for-termination statutory regime like that
of most other nations. Regardless of the merits of that position, such a change
6
simply is not going to occur in the United States in the foreseeable future."
I will support that not-so-bold prediction with evidence from the historical
record and brief consideration of why that record is as it is. Moreover, the
limited experience in the United States with states that have enacted statutory
schemes demonstrates that the statutes do not clearly give employees more
protection or redress than the common law schemes that they replace. Still,
consideration of both the unsuccessful proposals and the statutes that have
been enacted is relevant and important both because it substantiates my
prediction that no more statutes that provide significant protection are likely
to be enacted and because it accentuates the need for more robust common
law theories of recovery and remedies. It also demonstrates that the route to
enactment of legislation has gone first through common law development.'
Most proposals to statutorily displace employment at will have been
proposals for states to enact laws, such as the Uniform Law Commission's
Model Employment Termination Act."' Some, however, have been

113.

See Bird, supra note 18, at 517-18 (describing the prodigious scholarship on employment at

will).
Parker, supra note 20, at 370.
115. In an article published in 2004, Professor Bird observed that since 1985, at least 200 articles had
been published that critique some aspect of employment at will. Bird, supra note 18, at 518. He observed
that no significant changes had occurred and characterized this as "an area ofemployment law scholarship
virtually saturated with research that does not sufficiently impact current doctrine." Id.
116. See id. at 523 (positing that no change will occur because it "would require an immense
transformation of well-settled statutory and common law").
117. See, e.g., Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1582 (stating that recognition of a common law
cause of action "may be a necessary first-step toward securing support for [the proposed] legislative
114.

reform").
118. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Do Wrongful-DischargeLaws ImpairFirm Performance?,52 J. OF L.

& EcON. 197, 197 n.1 (2009).
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'

proposals for Congress to abrogate employment at will by federal
legislation."'
To begin with, I think it is almost a certainty that any legislative change
in employment at will would have to occur at the state level. Employment at
will, as followed by 49 states, is not federal law; it is state law. Despite
ambitious proposals for Congress to pass federal legislation abrogating
employment at will, that is not going to happen. This forbearance is not a
matter of Congressional authority, but Congressional will and restraint. As a
matter of federalism, Congress is not going to invade that area of state
regulation.' 2 0 This is unfortunate because states almost certainly will not
legislatively modify employment at will because legislators are likely to fear
that such a change would make them less attractive to businesses compared
to states that adhere to the doctrine.' 2
Turning then to the states, only Montana, has enacted a statutory scheme
abrogating employment at will, and that occurred in 1987.122 It is worth
noting about the Montana experience both the conditions that prompted the
adoption ofthe statute and the effect that it has had on the law of termination.
Employers and their insurers were the principal proponents who lobbied the
state legislature to enact the legislation, and they did so because employers
were losing cases under common law theories, principally a "double-barreled
tort" theory of WDVPP and breach of an implied covenant of good faith, and
facing large and unpredictable awards.' 23 These common law innovations by
the courts in Montana were part of a movement in state courts throughout the
nation during the 1970s and 1980s. Generally, numerous state courts
recognized one or more of the following common law theories that narrowed
the scope and impact of employment at will: implied contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy.' 2 4 However, that period of common law innovation ended

119. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 76; Befort, supra note 76, at 424; Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil
Rights andEmployment at Will: Toward a CoherentNationalDischargePolicy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443

(1996).
120. See Bird, supra note 18, at 524 ("Perhaps only sweeping congressional action, an extremely
unlikely possibility given the long entrenchment of employment at will, could enact just cause reform.").
121.

See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART

225, 228 (2008); cf Bales, supranote 54, at 463-67 (explaining the widespread adoption of employment
at will as states' responses to other states' adoption-that is, a race to the bottom of employment
standards).

122.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987).

123. See, e.g., Leonard,supranote 47 at 664-68; Marc Jarsulic, ProtectingWorkers From Wrongful
Discharge:Montana'sExperience With Tort andStatutory Regimes, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y

J. 105 (1999).
124. See, e.g., Coley, supra note 68, at 195-96; David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common
Law Wrongful DischargeDoctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 646

(1996).

2020

THE REFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE

85

around the 1990s,1 25 and courts began restricting or recanting on the common
law innovations. 126 Thus, since about 1990 employment at will has been
resurgent. Absent development of another significant common law theory
restricting employment at will, it is hard to imagine that powerful political
actors would advocate for enactment of such a statute in any state today.1 27
Moreover, advocates of such statutes should consider that the Montana
experience has not, by some accounts, produced better recoveries for plaintiff
employees. 128
The Uniform Law Commission's Model Employment Termination Act
("META"), which was promulgated in 1991, has not been adopted by a single
state.1 29 As Professor Befort observed, the fundamental impediment to
adoption of the META is that it does not offer employers "an adequate
tradeoff for their loss of the at-will prerogative."' First, META did not have
a sufficiently broad preemptive scope because it displaced most common law
claims, but not statutory claims.13' Second, the remedial scheme under
META was more expansive than that of most nations with such statutes.'3 2
In short, no other state in the nation is going to abrogate employment at
will unless conditions arise similar to those in Montana in 1987, to cause
businesses to lobby a state legislature for such a change. Businesses seem to
have adjusted to the existing exceptions to employment at will.'

125. See Bird, supra note 18, at 578 (stating that "[a]lthough scholarship helped make significant
inroads in curbing the worst excesses of employment at will, few fundamental changes have been made
to the doctrine since the heyday of innovation in the 1980s").
See infra Part IV.
127. Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution ofUnjust-DismissalLegislation in the UnitedStates, 44 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 644, 659 (1991) (stating that "the prospects for passage of unjust-dismissal legislation
are linked to the erosion of the common law employment-at-will doctrine"); Parker, supra note 20, at 373.
128. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 20, at 371-72 ("The Montana statute has essentially gutted
fundamental common law protections and theories of recovery"). Yet, the law may have produced a better
regime. See Donald C. Robinson, The FirstDecade ofJudicialInterpretationof the Montana Wrongful
126.

Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REV. 375, 422 (1996) (observing that "the
Montana WDEA has in fact resulted in a workable scheme that is understandable and predictable").
See Befort, supranote 76, at 426.
130. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 76, at 427; Bird, supra note 18, at 197 n.1; Daniel J. Libenson,
Leasing Human Capital:Toward a New Foundationfor Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMPL. & LAB. L. 111, 113-14 (2006).
129.

Befort, supranote 76, at 427-430.
132. Id. at 431-32 (positing that states were unlikely to move from employment at will to statutes
providing greater remedies than the wrongful discharge laws of other nations).
133. The adjustments, which have been many, include employing human resource employees and
employment attorneys, who develop defensive strategies to ward off or prevail in litigation. See generally,
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofingthe Workplace: Symbol andSubstance in Employment Discrimination
Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999). The rise and prevalence of mandatory arbitration
agreements is another. See generally, Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory
131.

Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2019).
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2. Limiting Employment at Will by Statutes: UsingExisting Statutes and
EnactingMore

As discussed above, the United States has many statutes at all levels
of government that do not displace employment at will but that do restrict it
to some extent. 13 4 The employment anti-discrimination statutes are the most
significant body of such statutes. An approach to providing job security for
more workers is to interpret the existing statutes expansively and/or to enact
more statutes that declare certain reasons and circumstances to be unlawful,
thus carving out more exceptions to employment at will.
Regarding the statutes already in place, courts should not stretch and
distort existing statutory law and doctrine thereunder to address bad or
abusive discharges.'13 The employment anti-discrimination laws have
become, in large part, wrongful discharge laws, with over fifty percent of the
charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
involving terminations.' When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
became effective in 1965, more charges were based on refusals to hire,' and
the shift to a preponderance of termination claims occurred as the law
achieved a purpose of opening employment opportunities to those to whom
they had been discriminatorily denied.'13

I think that the employment

discrimination doctrine developed by courts in case law has been shaped
narrowly in part by the perception that the discrimination laws have become

134.

See supraPart II.B.2.

135. Contract law is seldom distorted by courts to provide a remedy for discharged employees. On
the contrary, as I discuss below, contract doctrine as applied to employment has been warped and
deformed to deny recovery. There was a period of time, during the 1970s and 1980s, during which some
state courts stretched contract law to permit recovery, as discussed more fully below. See, e.g., Toussaint

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding good-cause contract);
Wooley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (presuming
reliance on provisions in an employment manual that employees may never have read).
136.

See EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, BASES BY ISSUE (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC)

FY 2010 - FY 2018 (2019),

https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcementibases-by

issue.cfm

[https://perma.cc/JHN7-NL8D].
137. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that "hiring charges outnumbered
termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1");
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, IndividualJustice or Collective Mobilization?
Employment DiscriminationLitigation in the PostCivil Rights UnitedStates, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 175,

177-80 (2010).
138. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 137, at 1015 ("Assuming that concrete improvements
have occurred, one might expect to see a significant shift in the nature of employment discrimination cases
as minorities and women no longer need to complain about blanket exclusions from good jobs-that battle
has, by now, largely been won-but now complain more commonly of being fired from these better

jobs.").
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wrongful discharge laws that restrict employer prerogative under
employment at will.' 39
I also do not think the enactment of numerous additional statutes limiting
employment at will is the best way or a practically feasible way to provide
additional protection against abusive termination to employees, although I
concede that the statutory approach does have some advantages over
development of common law doctrine.' 4 0 Here I am referring to individual
employment rights statutes, such as whistleblower or lawful activity statutes
rather than a general wrongful discharge statute. I argue against this
approach, although statutes have become, in recent decades, the vehicle of
choice for regulating the American workplace, as evidenced by the cavalcade
of statutes enacted.' 4 ' I agree with Professor Parker who, in advocating for
common law development, said that "[1]egislation cannot solve the deeply
rooted and multi-faceted problems surrounding employment-at-will." 42
First, enactment of statutes that restrict employment at will is beset with the
same problem as the ill-fated META and other proposed laws that would
displace employment at will. As a general matter, it is hard to muster the
political support to enact statutes that actually are protective of employees,
although the resistance varies from state to state and over time. 14 Statutes are
passed not necessarily because they embody good ideas, but because enough

139. Consider, for example, the bizarre hypothetical invoked by the Supreme Court in Univ. of Texas
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The Court's hypothetical presented an employee who was
about to be fired or suffer other adverse employment action who might file a frivolous discrimination
charge and then, when the adverse action occurred, file a retaliation charge. Id. at 358-59. The Court
concluded that employers would be put to greater costs because they would be unlikely to win on summary
judgment ifthe standard of causation were but-for. Id. The discussion of the hypothetical was part of the
rationale for adopting the more stringent but-for causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII.
For a fuller discussion of the shaping of employment discrimination law by courts' adherence to
employment at will, see William R. Corbett, The "Fall"ofSummers, the Rise of "PretextPlus" andthe
EscalatingSubordinationofEmployment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will, 30 GA. L. REV. 305,

372 (1996).
140. See, e.g., Peck, supra note I1, at 371 ("Legislation would provide more certain and effective
protection against unjust discharge than slow development ofjob protection in judicial decisions. Statutory
law is not limited or confined by development within a particular factual context. A well drafted statute
offers more immediate, comprehensive, and definitive protection. Statutes are more easily understood by
employees than the law extracted from judicial opinions.").
141. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 531
(1992) ("Most of the recent, significant developments in employment law have been accomplished
through federal and state legislation.").
142.

Parker, supranote 20, at 371.

143. California, for example, has many state and local laws providing protections and benefits for
workers. However, even in such a state, business resistance to some worker protections can be significant.

PrivacyBillforEmployee E-Mail Vetoedfor ThirdTime by CaliforniaGov. Davis,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 195 (Oct. 11, 2001).
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political support is brought to bear.1 44 Generally, employees have less
political clout than employers.1 45 In light of this imbalance, when
employment statutes are enacted at the state level, they sometimes are not
favorable to employees. Beyond the experience with the Montana Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act, 4 6 consider the euphemistically named
Arizona Employment Protection Act. The Arizona Act was enacted by the
state legislature, in part, to contain the state supreme court's expansion of the
WDVPP tort after the court decided Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital.147 The Arizona Act, despite its name, appears to have done more to
benefit employers than employees, although it is unclear whether it was very
detrimental to employees.' 48
Beyond the obstacle of mustering sufficient political support to enact
statutes that actually benefit employees, statutes often have precise language
and lack the flexibility of common law theories of recovery to address the
many circumstances that may arise in workplace terminations.14 Louisiana,
for example, enacted a statutory version of WDVPP.'5 o The statute protects
specified types of whistleblowing.'"' It also prohibits employers from taking
reprisal against employees who "[o]bject[] to or refuse[] to participate in an
52
One of the
employment act or practice that is in violation of law."'
difficulties with the statute is fitting employee conduct within the "object[]
to or refuse[] to participate in" language. The tort of WDVPP has more
flexibility because the covered acts are not identified by precise statutory
language. On the other hand, statutes admittedly do have a number of
advantages over common law theories, such as "immediate, comprehensive,
144. Peck, supra note I1, at 751-52; Blades, supra note 12, at 1434 ("Suffice it to say that general
statutory limitations on the employer's right of discharge are unlikely to be enacted so long as there is no
strong lobby to support them.").
145. Peck, supra note 11, at 751-52; Blades, supra note 12, at 1434.
146.

See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.

147.

710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). See infra notes 270-277 and accompanying text. See generally

Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona Employment ProtectionAct: A Return to the Employment-AtWill Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1139 (1997) (describing the act as the Legislature's response to the trend
away from employment-at-will that began in the mid-I 980s).
148. See generally Steven E. Abraham, The Arizona Employment ProtectionAct: Another "Wrongful
DischargeStatute" That Benefits Employers?, 12 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 105 (2008); Jones,
supra note 147; Jenny Clevenger, Comment and Legislative Review, Arizona's Employment Protection
Act: Drawing a Line in the Sand Between the Courtand the Legislature, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (1997)
(stating that the act effected dramatic changes . .. halting, and in some instances, reversing the expansion
of employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting recovery in tort where those rights are violated).
149. Consider, for example, the courts trying to decide the issue of whether dating is a "legal
recreational activity" under New York Labor Law § 201 -d(2)(c). See State v. Wal-Mart Stores, 207 A.D.2d

150 (N.Y. 1995); McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'g, 89 F.
Supp.2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
150. See La. R.S. 23:967 (2018).
151. Id. 23:967(A)(1) & (2).
152. Id. 23:967(A)(3).
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and definitive protection," and they are more accessible and perhaps
comprehensible to employers and employees. 153
In the end, even if statutes provide a superior vehicle for abrogating or
limiting employment at will, the statutory and common law approaches are
not mutually exclusive. More robust common law protections are needed.
First, the track record reveals the difficulty in enacting employee-protective
laws, so if courts do not act, as they did most conspicuously in the 1980s,
there is a lack of protection. Second, one of the chief services that common
law theories provide is that they can, over time, give employers incentive to
seek a better solution through legislative action, in which both sides may
receive something, 54 as evidenced by the enactment of the Montana and
Arizona Acts discussed above. Finally, legislatures seldom write and enact
legislation on a blank slate; instead, they review and react tojudicially created
theories.'15 Thus, the development of the common law not only may prompt
the enactment of legislation, but it also may provide the background and
education for the drafting of the statutes. Thus, the next Part posits that the
common law is the most promising source of restricting employment at will,
but that contract law is not the branch holding such potential.
IV. COMMON LAW LIMITATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND THE
INADEQUACY OF CONTRACT LAW

We are decades past the vibrant period of the 1970s and 1980s when
courts throughout the nation aggressively engaged in the development of
common law contract and tort theories that restricted employment at will.'
So vigorous were the courts in some states in creatively developing the
common law at that time that it has been described as an attack or assault on
employment at will. 1

Indeed, Walter Olson characterized Professor

153. See Peck, supranote 11, at 749.
154. Id. at 752-53; Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1581-82.
155. Peck, supra note 11, at 753.
156. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 18, at 521-22; Peck, supra note 11, at 725-34; Cavico, supra note
141, at 497 (describing the "erosion of the conventional employment at will doctrine and the concomitant
creation of statutory and common law exceptions to its dictate"); Leonard, supra note 47, at 647 ("Over
the past two decades judicial development of common-law exceptions to the presumption of at will
employment has been extraordinary... ."); Theodore St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law
During the Past QuarterCentury, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 412 (2010) [hereinafter St. Antoine,
ADR] (stating that "beginning in 1980, came a flood of court decisions that ultimately reached every state
except Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island and imposed at least some limitations on the absolutist reign
of at-will employment").
157. It is difficult in looking back on that period to discern what confluence of events, conditions,
and forces caused such a creative thrust by the courts. Some have posited that the courts acted because
collective bargaining had collapsed as a regime for regulating the American workplace. See, e.g.,
Summers, Effective Remedies, supranote 42, at 459-60. However, the decline in union representation and
collective bargaining had been occurring for years before. See, e.g., Robert J. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation
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Lawrence Blades's important article proposing the tort of abusive discharge
as having launched an academic assault on employment at will.'
Interestingly, Professor Henry Perritt sees an article by Professor Clyde
Summers proposing a wrongful dismissal statute as "part of the genesis of
the common law revolution in wrongful dismissal law."' So significant
were the common law developments that, when combined with statutory
efforts such as the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act and the ultimately
moribund Model Employment Termination Act, 16 0 several commentators
predicted the imminent demise of employment at will.16' From today's
perspective, those predictions appear recklessly bold, as it has been clear for
a couple of decades now that the common law "assault" on employment at
will subsided.1 62 Employment at will is stronger now than it was thirty years
ago,1' as many of the common law developments have been diluted or

and Union Representations, 38 STAN. L. REV. 957, 981-82 (1986). However, it is plausible that the
Wagner Act regime had reached a level of demise by 1980 that prompted the courts to act. In 1980, union
density was down to about 18% in the overall workforce (public and private). Id at 981. It also is possible

that the flurry of legislative enactments, beginning with the Equal Pay Act in 1963 and Title VII in 1964
and continuing for over a couple of decades, emboldened the courts. See generally Summers, Effective
Remedies, supra note 42, at 458 ("The trend did not begin with the employment at will cases but can be

traced back at least to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) .... [o]ther acts building upon this statutory trend included the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSH), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."); see also
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 728 (stating that enactment of civil rights laws in the 1960s "gave further
support to the concept that unchallenged employer prerogative in hiring and firing decisions had to give
way to other social interests").
158. Walter Olson, The Trouble with Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 32 (1999):
"Lawrence Blades . . . kicked off the modem revolution in state employment law with his article in the
Columbia Law Review in 1967 launching the attack on employment at will. The resulting intellectual
insurgency, which soon spread to pretty much every law faculty, was to transform American employment
law quite dramatically." Id. at 32.
159.

Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self

Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 397, 422 & n.129 (1989).
160.

See supra Part IIL.B.L.

161. Consider, for example, the following prediction from 2000: "The future of employment-at-will,
then, is that it has no future." Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a

Doctrine,37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 685-86 (2000); see also Peck, supra note 11, at 4 (predicting the demise
of employment at will); Cavico, supra note 141, at 497 (explaining that the growing momentum of court
development of the public policy tort exception "point[s] to the eventual demise of the employment at will
doctrine").
162. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 47, at 1688 ("The argument that wrongful discharge law has
eviscerated employment at will is simply overstated."); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practice of
International Labor & Employment Law: Escort Your Labor/Employment Clients into the Global
Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 13-14 (2001) ("U.S. employment lawyers say that America's employment
at will has eroded away, but theirs is a historical, not an international perspective. By comparison to other
countries, employment at will is alive and well in the U.S.").
163. Cf Libenson, supranote 130, at 127 (stating that, despite the exceptions, "a powerful ghost still
looms").
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overturned.'" For all the common law developments of the 1970s and 1980s,
the decades after that were marked by substantial retrenchment. Admittedly,
one can argue that the ebbing of common law protections is an argument for
legislative engagement and statutory protections. However, calls for
legislative solutions and common law solutions are not mutually exclusive.
Recent history has witnessed more legislative successes, but there is
opportunity and need for the courts' re-engagement in this area.
In the last great common law incursion on employment at will, courts in
various states developed contract, tort, and hybrid doctrines that limited
employment at will.'

5

Because statutes do not offer a satisfactory or

sufficient way of imposing additional restrictions on employment at will,'
what is needed is a second common law thrust. Contract law, infused with,
and misshaped by, the employment at will doctrine, does not offer adequate
doctrine for such an incursion. Tort law, although not adequate in its current
state, has untapped potential to restrict employment at will.
A. There is a Needfor More Effective Common Law Limitationsof
Employment at Will
Before turning to the inherent weaknesses of contract law as applied to
employment and the untapped potential of tort law, I first address why I think
we need a more robust common law limiting employment at will. Do we
really need a second common law "assault" on employment at will? I do not
think that we need another period of freewheeling experimentation in which
courts try out various contract, tort, and hybrid theories and remedies as they
did in the 1970s/1980s. The historical record reveals that most of those
experiments were rather short-lived, as courts relented 6 7 and legislatures
stepped in to circumscribe the innovations, as in Montana and Arizona.'
However, I do think a more effective common law theory of recovery is
needed for abusive terminations. WDVPP was the most durable and
prominent survivor from the 1970s/ 1 980s, and that fact suggests that tort law
164. See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991) (distinguishing
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)); Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l
Inc. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000) (limiting the effect of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981));
Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, PublicPolicy, andthe Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671,
680 (1996) ("Despite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule has retained its vitality and, if anything,
has been regaining strength in recent years."); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United

States: The Divine Right ofEmployers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 85 (2000) ("[T]he trend in the last
ten years has been toward more employer dominance."); see also Parker, supra note 20, at 350-51
(discussing the scrutiny of employment at will during the 1970s and 1980s, but concluding that courts
have not developed coherent tort and contract law regarding the doctrine).
165. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 647-67.
166.

See supra Part III.B.

167.

See supra note 164.

168.

See supranotes 122-128 and 147-148 and accompanying text.
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could be further developed to provide a worthwhile and effective common
law limitation on employment at will.
Some would argue that employment at will does not need to be limited,
as Professor Epstein and Mr. Olson argued during the first assault.1 69 Others
would argue that, regardless whether employment at will needs to be further
limited, common law or tort law is not the appropriate or best way to do it. 7 1

Regarding the second argument, I have already explained what I see as the
limitations of statutes.' 7 ' Accordingly, I turn to the first issue-why we need
additional restrictions of employment at will.
Termination from employment is a major event in the life of a person
that, in most cases, has enormously significant financial, psychological, and
social consequences.1 72 It also harms society because it takes from citizens
central attributes of citizenship. 7 1 Many, and perhaps most, at-will
employees likely do not understand that they can be fired for bad reasons;
that state of the law does not match their expectations. It seems likely that
this disconnect between understanding/expectations and actual law has
increased since the passage of so many statutes, such as anti-discrimination,
anti-retaliation, and whistleblower statutes. Employees are aware there is a
large and complex body of statutes that provide protection against
termination under some circumstances, even if they do not know the specific
protections.1 74 There also likely is a competing notion, however, that
employees in "protected groups" enjoy job security that other employees do
not."' From the employer's perspective, the proliferation of statutes has
placed employers in the position that few human resources departments
would recommend firing an employee for a bad reason or without
documentation of a good reason."' Thus, while we may have employment at
will as our default principle of law regarding termination, our expectations
and values are not fully consistent with it, and most employers do not operate

169.

See supra notes 103, 158.

170.

See, e.g., Dennis P. Duffy, IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistressandEmployment at Will:

The CaseAgainst "Tortification" ofLaborandEmployment Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 404 (1994).
171. See supra Part III.B.
172. See supranotes 5-15 and accompanying text. See also Libenson, supranote 130, at 123 (stating
that among the academic criticisms of employment at will, "an important common denominator is that the
at-will rule essentially gives employers an unchecked right to impose devastating economic and personal

harms on undeserving individuals").
173.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

174.

See supra notes 94-96; Leonard, supra note 47, at 633.

175. See supra note 76. Professor Bisom-Rapp has explained that the procedures developed by
employers in response to employment discrimination laws may enable them to successfully defend claims
but may not ensure nondiscriminatory employment actions. Bisom-Rapp, supranote 133.
176.

See, e.g., Libenson, supra note 130, at 113.
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as though they will not be required to give a reason for a discharge."' Indeed,
society has embraced the norm that certain bad-motive terminations are
wrong and should be subject to legal redress."' While it is a positive
development that employers are adjusting their practices, it is a role of tort
law to enforce societal standards and impose liability when they are
violated. 7 9 Indeed, a common law approach may be preferable to a statutory
approach when society already has begun to adjust norms and expectations.'so
The only question then is what bad reasons and abusive terminations should
be subject to redress and how do we provide that redress.
Common law theories supplement the statutory bases for recovery, and,
as I have argued, they are needed because statutes have substantive and
practical limits. As the 1970s/1980s period demonstrates, we want common
law theories of recovery to supplement the statutes. It is a function of tort law
to protect societal values.' Moreover, the availability of common law
theories of recovery and remedies may obviate resort to anti-discrimination
and other statutes for bad-reason terminations that do not really fit under the,
statutes.' 82 Perhaps, in the end, the need for common law theories is obvious
as Professor Mark Gergen suggested in defending the "collateral torts"
applied to wrongful termination.' 83
If one accepts the proposition that additional common law restrictions
are needed, to which branch of the common law should courts turn? The next

177. See Leonard, supra note 47, at 637 (arguing that in workplaces regulated by so many rules and
regulations, the employment-at-will gap filler "is now in considerable doubt").
178. See, e.g., Estlund, supranote 47, at 1664 (explaining that the "'bad motive' exceptions at their
core rest on strong and widely shared moral commitments that reach well beyond the workplace").

179.

See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 834

(1998) ("The possibility that government will advocate particular patterns of behavior might go some
distance toward providing a centralizing authority for the enunciation of norms, but unless government
goes further to provide sanctions, those who are subject to the norm may lack sufficient confidence about
the compliance of others to make norms as susceptible to rapid change as common law or statutory law.").
180. Cf Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism:The Discovery of Better
EnvironmentalPolicy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 705, 717 (2008) (arguing that "if norms vary from one
jurisdiction to another, the common law can reflect those differences much more accurately than
centralized statutory regulation").
181. Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the
American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1995) ("Tort jurisprudence is a relatively accurate
reflector of American society's basic principles for microgovemance.").
182. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the TripartiteDivision ofAmerican Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 181 (2007) ("Employees who have discharge claims that are compelling
as a matter of fairness, but which do not meet the requirements of proof under discrimination law,
frequently attempt to squeeze their 'square peg' of a case into the 'round hole' of the applicable legal
category, lest the employment-at-will rule bring their action to an abrupt halt.").
183. See Gergen, supra note 21, at 1694 (stating that "it is self-evident why we might want to
compensate employees and punish firms or their agents through a tort remedy in extreme cases of cruelty
or slander").
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section addresses why contract law does not have the potential to further
restrict employment at will.
B. ContractLaw is Inferior to Tort Law as a Source ofDoctrinefor
Limiting Employment at Will
Relying on tort law to restrict employment at will avoids the pitfalls of
contract law in the employment context. First, employment at will, however
it is regarded-rebuttable evidentiary presumption, substantive rule-is
within the ambit of contract law. Employment at will describes the
termination rules regarding a type of employment contract. In order to permit
recovery for breach of an employment contract, courts must find evidence of
an agreement between employer and employee that overcomes the
employment-at-will default. Courts seldom find sufficient evidence of such
an agreement.' 84 Doctrinally, courts do not have to accept weakening of
employment at will in the realm of contract law to permit recovery under tort
law.' Tort law, in contrast to contract law, does not depend upon the
understandings and intentions of the parties. Courts can more readily accept
a tort remedy, and thus they do not weaken the at-will presumption, because
they do not have to undermine the presumption of employment at will, and
they do not have to find that parties agreed to a variation in at-will
employment; rather, the tort is based on duties implied in law based on
societal judgments.' A related point is that a tort-based duty cannot be
divested by an employer's supposed bargaining-and more likely, coercion.
This is an important advantage because a protection that can be taken away
by one party's superior bargaining power is not much protection at all.
184.

See infra note 199.
185. Admittedly, many court decisions have expressed reluctance to permit recovery under the
WDVPP theory because of the tort's supposed infringement on employment at will. See, e.g., Bammert

v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002); Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled
Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 1992). However, those decisions accord the at-will principle
importance beyond its contract sphere of influence. As some commentators have explained:
A rule of contract law has no special place in the decision to recognize a tort for the abuse of
superior economic position in derogation of public policy.. . . Judicial preoccupation with
employment-at-will suggests the same sort of underlying bias reflected by the preoccupation
with privity of contract prior to the development of modem product liability law.
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATIONS: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
137 (2d ed. 1993); see also Coley, supranote 68, at 215 ("Unlike the implied contract doctrine discussed
immediately above and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing discussed below, the public
policy doctrine does not stand in such direct tension with contractual employment.").
186.

See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, andthe Low, 72 CHI.-KENT

L. REv. 221, 223 (1996) ("[T]he law of torts ...

assigns liability for societally imposed, non-contractual

duties...."); Cavico, supra note 141, at 504-05. Tort law imposes duties on parties in the interest of
society regardless of the obligations they agree to in contract. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, Comment,
Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenantof GoodFaith andFairDealingas a Tort, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 1291, 1306-07 (1985) (describing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as nonconsensual and
extracontractual and recommending recognition of breach of that covenant as a tort).

2020

THE REFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE

95

Contract law doctrine and tenets have been savagely distorted in the
context of employment law because of the overwhelming obeisance of courts
to employment at will.' There are numerous examples. Most courts require
a precise form of evidence to overcome the at-will presumption and routinely
dismiss evidence that would be deemed probative of most other types of
contracts.'" The employment contract concepts of additional consideration
and mutuality of obligation, which are often invoked to defeat contracts
alleged to be other than at-will, are corruptions of traditional contract doctrine
foisted on employment law by courts' passion to preserve employment at
will.' When Professor Blades proposed the tort of abusive discharge, he
found it reasonable to bypass contract law because of its rigid doctrinal
requirements.'" 0 Perhaps this should not be surprising because employment
contract formation and termination never has fit well into the exchange
transaction model of commercial contracts, in which there is a discrete
transaction and the contractual relationship does not span a long period of
time with changing circumstances."' The relational contract model,
developed by Ian Macneil' 92 better accounts for the dynamics of the
employment contract and relationship.'
The historical record also suggests that contract law is inferior to tort
law in restricting employment at will. The contract law innovations of the
last great incursion on employment at will have not proven durable. The
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has virtually disappeared
from employment law'94 after a somewhat successful period in the 1970s and
80s.' 95 Many of the contract innovations, such as in Pugh v. See's Candies'96

187.

See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56, at 1097-1102; Cavico, supra

note 141, at 501-02.
188. See, e.g., Coley, supra note 68, at 214 ("While a majority of American jurisdictions--roughly
seventy-five percent--recognize the implied contract doctrine, approximately half of these jurisdictions
limit the doctrine's applicability exclusively to those cases involving written, rather than oral employer
representations.").
189. See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56; Blades, supranote 12, at 141921; Parker, supra note 20, at 385-89.
190. Professor Lawrence Blades considered and rejected an implied contract term as inefficacious in
protecting employees. Blades, supra note 12, at 1421-22 (finding it "reasonable to bypass the law of
contracts and its unyielding requirement of consideration by turning to the more elastic principles of tort
law").
191.

See Leonard, supranote 47, at 663.

192. See, e.g., Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, andRelationalContract Law, 72 Nw. U .L. REv. 854 (1978).
193.

See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 28, at 391-94.

194.

See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changingthe Employment

At- Will DefaultRule to Protect PersonalAutonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 232-33 (2017).
195.

See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV.

427,469-74(2016).
196. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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in
in California and Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.
9
Michigan, have been rolled back.' In every state, it is now extremely
difficult for a terminated employee who is not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement to prove that she has an employment contract that is
other than at will.1 99
Simply put, contract law in the context of employment has been shaped,
distorted, and dominated by employment at will. Although many
commentators have decried this corruption of contract law, it is what the
courts have done. Given both disfigured doctrine and a historical record of
no enduring effective theory, there is no basis for thinking that courts will
implement substantial and lasting contract restrictions on employment at will.
Although tort law has the potential to impose such restrictions, the next Part
considers weaknesses in the current tort law in the realm of employment that
renders it unable to effectively harness employment at will.

V. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING TORT LAW TO APPROPRIATELY LIMIT
ABUSIVE DISCHARGES
Among the many bad terminations that occur in the United States, Green
v. Bryant.o involved what strikes me as among the worst in the reported
decisions.2 0 ' The case also serves as an exemplar of the weaknesses of the
existing tort theories that are available to discharged employees. Ms. Green
worked at a doctor's office. While not at work, she was attacked by her
estranged husband, who beat her with a pipe and raped her at gunpoint. When
she reported for work, she was fired, presumably because the employer
feared that her violent spouse might come to her workplace and injure
people.202 Ms. Green sued for her termination based on legal theories of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court denied recovery on all
theories, granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On her
WDVPP claim, Ms. Green argued that the public policies implicated were
protecting an employee's right to privacy and protecting victims of crime or

197. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
198. See supranote 164.
199. See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56, at 1097-1109. The increased
difficulty is due in part to courts providing guidance to employers to include at-will language in writings
that they provide to employees, such as employee handbooks. See, e.g., Fischl, supra note 182, at 195.
200. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
201. See Schwab, supranote 17, at 1948 (discussing Green as a "striking example" of the doctrinaire
approach of courts in dismissing wrongful discharge cases because they involve private rather than public
issues).
202. Green, 887 F. Supp. at 800 n.2.
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spousal abuse. 203 The court found that plaintiffs termination did not violate
the public policy favoring privacy because there was no evidence that the
employer sought to obtain private information about plaintiff.20 4 The
plaintiffs argument regarding protecting victims of crime or spousal abuse
cited numerous state statutes manifesting the public policy. 205 The court
dismissed the claim because the statutes relied upon by the plaintiff did not
create employment rights and privileges and victims were entitled to only the
benefits or privileges expressly provided for in the statutes.2 06 The court
dismissed the intentional infliction claim because it found that the
circumstances alleged by the plaintiff did not rise to the level of
"outrageous." 207 Regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress, the
court held that employers do not, when they terminate, breach a duty of
reasonable care owed by an employer to an employee. 208 The good faith and
fair dealing claim failed because, the court held, there is no bad faith when
an employer terminates an at-will employee.209
I think that Ms. Green should have recovered for her termination under
a tort theory.210 Although the employer had an articulable interest in
terminating her (fear of violence in the workplace), that interest should not
have been found to outweigh the competing interests of Ms. Green and the
public. There are several tort theories, in addition to those pled in Green, that
can, in appropriate circumstances, be applicable to terminations, such as
defamation and invasion of privacy. 211 There are only two tort theories that I
wish to considerm'-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
("WDVPP") and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
Intentional infliction is one of the "collateral torts" that is not specifically
applicable to employment termination.213 Stated differently, IIED can apply
to any type of conduct that may be characterized as "outrageous"; IIED is not
applicable to only employment terminations or other employment acts.
203.

Id. at 801.
Id.
205. Id. (citing Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
Compensation Board, 71 P.S. § 180-7 et seq).
204.

206.

§

6101 et seq; Crime Victim's

Id.

Id. at 802.
Id.
209. Id. at 803.
210. Legislatures sometimes see the need to address situations such as that presented in Green v.
Bryant. In 2018 California enacted a statute prohibiting employment discrimination against victims of
domestic violence. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1. While such statutes can address particular "bad"
reasons for terminating employees, a common law tort can address a broader range of "bad" terminations.
211. Obviously, not all terminations will involve facts that even arguably satisfy the elements of
defamation or invasion of privacy. Some, however, do involve such facts.
212. See Gergen, supranote 21(also discussing defamation and other tort theories sometimes used).
213. Id. at 1699.
207.

208.
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WDVPP, on the other hand, addresses specifically and only discharge from
employment. These two tort theories have been largely unsuccessful for
plaintiffs, and this is particularly true of IIED.2 14 WDVPP exists in several
different forms in the many states that recognize the theory.215 It is a tort
theory that held great promise, but its various iterations, uncertain elements,
and uncertain connection to identification and preservation of public policy
have rendered it a poor match for the powerful employment at will doctrine
that it weakly limits. Despite their weaknesses, these two tort theories have
the potential to be reshaped and used in ways that impose meaningful limits
on employment at will.
A. The Enigmatic Tort of WDVPP: Origins,Foundations,Development, and
Problems
WDVPP is a curious case among torts. It is a distinctly American tort of
relatively recent vintage in the annals of tort law. Most chronicles trace the
tort's origin to the 1959 California court of appeals decision in Petermannv.
Int'l Bhd. Teamsters.2 16 The tort did not gain the momentum of adoption by
many states, however, until after the publication of Professor Lawrence
Blades's article proposing the tort of abusive discharge in 1967.217 During the
1970s, a few states recognized the tort, and the number increased
significantly in the 1980s.2 18 Today, all but about nine states recognize some
version of WDVPP,2 1 9 yet it is nebulous and generally inefficacious.220
In Petermann,a union business agent sued when his employer fired him
for refusing to commit perjury in testimony before a state legislative
committee. The court crafted a common law exception to employment at will
to permit recovery, stating as follows:
[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury,
the civil law, too must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration,
when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury.
214.

See Cavico, supra note 141.

215.

Libenson, supra note 130, at 128 ("The breadth of this wrongful discharge tort varies

tremendously.").
216. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
217.

Blades, supranote 12, at 1434.

218.

Bird, supra note 18, at 521.

219.

ROTHSTEIN,supra note 68, at 750 (5th ed. 2015). The Rothstein treatise lists Alabama, Florida,

Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island as states that do not recognize the tort, and notes
that Arizona and Montana have statutes that regulate employment termination. Id.; see also Charles J.
at
(2001),
exceptions
major
three
doctrine:
employment-at-will
The
Muhl,
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/artl full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PST-LCTE]. Louisiana, however,
also has a statute that regulates some aspects of wrongful discharge. See LA. R.S. 23:967.
220. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan, The PublicPolicyException to the Employment at Will Rule
Comes ofAge: A ProposedFrameworkforAnalysis, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 481, 488 (1991).
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To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of the
law.221
The court seemingly then treated this theory as a breach of contract
claim, explaining that firing for the alleged reason would be improper
because it would constitute a failure to act in good faith.2 2 2 Later California
decisions would characterize the theory of recovery as a tort. 2 23 At the time it
was decided, Petermann did not clearly look to be the development of a new
common law limitation on employment at will.22 4 After some other adoptions
of the tort,2 2 5 the theory was examined, the case law surveyed, and the tort
theory adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1975 in Nees v. Hocks.2 2 6
The tort gained academic grounding and more momentum in the courts
after Professor Lawrence Blades advocated for recognition of a new tort of
abusive discharge.2 2 7 Blades argued that the power of corporations had come
to rival that of governments and that it was anomalous that the law placed
restrictions on government action against citizens but not actions of
corporations and other employers that result in discharge of employees.2 2 8
Using the torts of abuse of process and intentional interference with
contractual relations by a third party as models and the underlying rationale
of prima facie tort, 2 29 Blades proposed a tort of abusive discharge. He posited
that the proposed tort would provide a remedy when an employer discharges
an employee in order to effectuate an ulterior purpose, other than that for
which the right to discharge was designed. 230 Although Blades acknowledged
the argument for the more radical approach of extending all constitutional
restrictions on government to employers, he saw such an approach as too
expansive and unnecessary if legislatures enacted statutes or courts

221.

Petermann,344 P.2d at 27.

222. Id. at 28; see also Schwab, supra note 17, at 1951 (noting that the Petermann court purported
to find violation of an implied term of the employment contract).
223.

Schwab, supranote 17, at 1951 n.38 (citing later California decisions).

224. Peck, supra note I1, at 723-24 (stating that Petermannwas viewed as a "'sport' rather than as
a general modification of employment law").
225.

See, e.g., Peck, supra note 11, at 723-725.

226.

Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).

227. Blades, supra note 12. Professor Blades's article has been cited by 88 court decisions and 538
secondary sources. Walter Olson declared that the article "kicked off the modem revolution in state
employment law." Olson, supra note 158, at 32; see also Ballam, supra note 57, at 659 (noting that, after
Petermann,courts in other states did not begin adopting WDVPP until after the publication of Blades's
article).
228. Blades, supra note 12, at 1404; see also Cynthia Estlund, Book Review, Rethinking Autocracy
at Work PrivateGovernment: How Employers Rule Our Lives (And Why We Don't Talk About it). By

ElizabethAnderson. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. 2017. PP. X1II1, 196. $27.95, 131 HARV. L.
REv. 795, 795 (2018) (asking, "How is it that a democratic society devoted to individual freedom came
to tolerate the private outposts of autocratic rule and unfreedom in which most citizens spend their lives?").
229.

Blades, supra note 12, at 1423-25.

230.

Id.
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developed theories to stem the tide of abusive discharges.23 1 Blades's
approach to proposing a new tort was cautious and conservative, analogizing
the proposed new tort to existing torts.232 Although Blades's article was
frequently cited by courts adopting or adhering to the tort of WDVPP, the
abusive discharge tort envisioned by Professor Blades was different than, and
probably broader than, the various versions of WDVPP.233
WDVPP is rooted primarily in the prima facie tort theory of Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Francis Pollock.234 Holmes's and Pollock's general
theory provided that intentional infliction of harm is tortious unless the
tortfeasor can justify her action on policy or ethical grounds.235 Some courts,
most notably the New York courts, took the general theory of Holmes and
Pollock and distilled out of it a specific tort called prima facie tort.2 36 In Nees
v. Hocks, the Oregon Supreme Court decision adopting the tort of WDVPP,
the plaintiff, who was fired for not fully complying with her employer's
instruction that she request to be excused from jury service, pled the tort
theory of prima facie tort. The Oregon court took note of "the New York
experience indicat[ing] the difficulties of transposing a very broad principle
of liability into a specific tort."2 37 The court eschewed adoption of the prima
facie tort in favor of recognizing the emerging tort of WDVPP. 3 It is notable
that torts based on the general prima facie tort rationale tend to be rather
"formless."239 It was this formless or amorphous nature that, in part, caused
the Oregon court to refuse to adopt the prima facie tort. However, WDVPP,
rooted in the general prima facie tort theory, has not fared much better in
terms of concreteness or certainty of elements.240
The rise of the tort of WDVPP in the 1970s and 1980s did not occur in
isolation. This was, as already discussed, the period of the great assault on
employment at will that led to predictions of the demise of the doctrine.
231. Id. at 1432 ("If contrary to this assumption, the legislatures or the courts proceed quickly with
the task of developing other approaches, it will not be necessary to resort to the drastic yet inadequate step
of limiting the exercise of private power through recourse to constitutional law.").
232. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 1547 n.41.
See Ballam,supra note 57, at 660.
234. Parker, supra note 20, at 355. On the historical evolution of the theory, see generally Kenneth
J. Vandevelde, A History ofthe Prima Facie Tort: The Origins ofa General Theory of IntentionalTort,
19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 447 (1991). As noted above, the tort also has been cited as an implied manifestation
in American law of the civil law doctrine of abuse of rights. See supra note 41.
235. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d at 513; Vandevelde, supra note 234, at 447; Gergen, Tortious
Interference: How It is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why That is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential
Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996) [hereinafter, Gergen, Tortious Interference].
233.

236.

See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 234, at 487-91.

237.
238.

Nees, 536 P.2d at 514.
Id. at 514-516.

239. Gergen,supranote 21, at 1696-97 (labeling the following torts as formless: invasion of privacy,
intentional interference with business relations, and prima facie tort).
240.

See Callahan,supra note 220, at488.
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Courts across the nation recognized contract, tort, and hybrid theories that
permitted recovery notwithstanding employment at will. 241' The incursion was
not limited to the courts, as state legislatures, to a lesser extent, passed
employment statutes that limited the rights of employers to terminate
employees. From that period, WDVPP emerged as the most recognized
common law restriction on employment at will.24 2 Just as the tide of change
ebbed in the 1990s and employment at will began to reclaim its
prominence,24 3 the lack of clarity and limited usefulness of WDVPP became
increasingly apparent. In 1997, Professor Bernstein, in evaluating four "new"
torts, declared WDVPP to be "the most precarious, the least firmly fixed" of
the four torts she considered.2 44 The recognition of WDVPP by over fourfifths of the states and its inclusion in the Restatement ofEmployment Law
indicate it is solidly established. However, it is among the most nebulous
torts, existing in different iterations, and with divergent analyses, scopes, and
rationales. Several commentators have tried to make sense of the case law,
while others have proposed modifications. Yet for all its problems, WDVPP
remains the most commonly recognized discrete common law exception to
employment at will. What accounts for the tort's weakness?
WDVPP has been challenging and vexing in at least two key respects:
(1) the rationale for permitting recovery; and (2) what a plaintiff must prove
2 46
in order to recover. 245 There are two basic approaches to the tort. The
approach followed by a majority of states recognizing the tort begins with
three or four categories of fact situations: employee is terminated for (1)
refusing to perform illegal acts; (2) exercising legal rights; (3) performing
public duties; or (4) whistleblowing. 2 47 Thus, under this approach, recovery
for WDVPP is permitted only if the fact situation fits into one of these

241.

See supraPart IV.

242.

Mark A. Fahleson, The PublicPolicy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should Courts

Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 958 (1993) (describing the tort as "[b]y far the most
widely recognized judicial limitation on the rule"); Parker, supranote 20, at 392 (calling the tort "[t]he
most widely accepted common law limitation to an employer's broad right to discharge at at-will
employee"); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy

Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983) (calling the tort "[t]he most widely accepted limitation
on the rule").
243. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 18, at 522-23 (detailing the denouement of the "veritable open
declaration of war by courts and commentators on employment at will in the 1970s").
244. Bernstein, supranote 37, at 1547. The three other torts she considered were lHED, strict products

liability, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 1541.
245. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 220, at 488 (stating that "few decisions involving the public
policy exception give explicit consideration to the elements of the claim; fewer still address the allocation
of burden of proof').
246. See FINKIN, supra note 12, at44.
247. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 750. The categories or pigeonholes of WDVPP make it look
somewhat like the tort of invasion of privacy, of which it has been said it is unclear whether it is one tort
or four different torts. See Gergen, Tortious Interference,supranote 235, at 1697 n.9.
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categories or "pigeonholes."2 4 8 Some states recognize the tort under only one
or two of the four fact scenarios. Texas, for example, recognizes only
wrongful discharge for refusing to perform an illegal act.2 49 Moreover, Texas
has further limited its recognition to refusal to perform illegal acts for which
the law imposes criminal penalties. 25 0 States recognizing the categories also
require a plaintiff to identify a public policy that is implicated in the fact
situation and require the plaintiff to establish causation between the
employee's act in support of public policy and the termination. A second
approach to WDVPP, followed by a small minority of states, recognizes the
tort when a plaintiff can establish certain elements: 251 (1) clear public policy;
(2) discouraging plaintiffs conduct by termination would jeopardize the
public policy; (3) the public-policy linked conduct caused the termination;
and (4) the employer cannot offer an overriding justification for the
termination.2 52 The Washington Supreme Court noted the two different
approaches in Gardnerv. Loomis Armored, Inc., and embraced the elementsbased approach, under which recovery was granted for a fact situation that
did not fit well into any of the four categories.253
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Employment Law
articulated a version of WDVPP that follows the categories or pigeon-hole
approach.25 4 The Restatement does add some categories to the four mentioned
above and adds a catchall category: "engages in other activity directly
furthering a well-established public policy." Professor Matthew Finkin has
criticized the ALI's endorsement of this approach as not permitting for
adequate development and evolution of the law.2 55
Generally, courts have interpreted WDVPP grudgingly and narrowly.2 5 6
This seems attributable to at least two issues. First, in a majority of
jurisdictions that follow the pigeonhole approach, there is no authority for a
248. See Schwab, supra note 17, at 1954- (terming this process of categorization "pigeonhole
analysis").

249. See, e.g., Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1990); Sabine Pilot, Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
250.

ROTHSTEIN, supranote 68, at 753.
251. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.7 (1991); Perritt,
supra note 159, at 398-99; Note, Guidelinesfor a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will
Rule: The Wrongful DischargeTort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981). The number and specification of the
elements varies, depending on the source. Courts in Iowa, Ohio, Washington, and West Virginia have

adopted this approach. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000);
Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995); Gardner v. Loomis, 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash.
1996); Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, 696 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 2010).
252.

The number and statement of elements varies depending on the source relied upon. Callahan,

supra note 220, at 492-94 & 493 nn. 55-57.
253. 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).

§ 5.02

254.

RESTATEMENTOF EMPLOYMENT LAW

255.

FINKIN, supra note 12, at 44-45.

256.

See, e.g., Callahan,supranote 220, at 515.

(2015).
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specified set of elements in a procedural framework.25 7 Second, the central
rationale articulated for the tort (and from which it takes its name) is that the
discharge is subject to legal redress not because the plaintiff employee was
injured by the action, but because permitting the termination poses a threat to
the public.

25 8

The search for public policy in WDVPP claims has been described by
courts and commentators as the "Achilles heel" of the tort. 259 "Public policy"
is an inherently and notoriously vague term.260 A plaintiff must identify a
clear public policy that is implicated in her termination. Most courts take a
narrow view of the sources that they deem appropriate to consult for such a
public policy. Most are reluctant to accept a proposed public policy unless it
is anchored in a constitution or statute, although in a minority ofjurisdictions
courts take a more expansive view of what may be sources of public policy. 261
Most courts' reluctance to adopt expansive views of the tort stems from
two principal concerns. First, WDVPP unequivocally impinges on employer
prerogative under the employment-at-will doctrine. Although it is true that
employer discretion is otherwise significantly restricted by many
employment statutes and ordinances, and most saliently, the employment
discrimination laws, those restrictions are imposed by legislatures. Judges
realize that under the WDVPP tort they are second guessing management
decisions from the bench.262 That concern leads to the second consideration
that results in the narrow scope. Courts find justification for the second
guessing of employers by reasoning that the employer's decision is not just
bad or offensive to the court, but it violates a well-defined public policy of
the state, which the court must protect. In articulating such clearly defined
public policies, courts risk the accusation that they are activists who are
legislating from the bench. Sometimes, state legislatures even perceive it that

257.

Id. at 516-17.

258. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1944 (stating that courts "attempt to cabin [the tort's]
domain by insisting that the discharge violate public policy rather than involve a mere spat between
employer and employee").
259. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); see also Ludwick v. This

Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 223, 337 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1985) ("The difficulty rests in
determining a precise definition of the expression 'public policy."'); Callahan, supra note 220, at 492
("Clearly, articulation of an appropriate definition of 'public policy' has vexed courts and commentators
throughout much of the life of this exception to the at-will rule").

260.

See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981).

261. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 752 (stating that although early cases often looked
broadly for public policy, "the more recent trend has been to restrict public policy to legislative sources");
Libenson, supra note 130, at 128 (stating that "[mlost states require that the violated public policy is
'clearly established' in a statute, constitution, or other specific source of law"); Schwab, supra note 17, at
1957-58 (noting the "recent trend" toward requiring identification of public policy in a statute or
regulation rather than an "open-ended" or "freewheeling" search).
262.

See Peck, supra note 11, at 749.
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way and react to such judicial proclamations of public policy.263 Schwab
points out that the middle-ground approach2 "6 of limiting employment at will
by insisting on jeopardy to public policy results in line-drawing efforts that
lead to "muddled opinions and contradictory holdings."265
There is a second part of the search-for-public-policy requirement that
is seldom discussed by the courts and thus is largely underdeveloped.2 66 The
issue has been characterized as the "impact" that the discharge has on the
identified public policy, or the "jeopardy" in which it places the policy.2 67 It
is interesting that this issue is rarely discussed by the courts when it is integral
to the rationale given for recognizing the tort. In most cases it seems likely
that one discharge, the one at issue in the case, seldom will pose a great threat
to the implicated public policy. Instead, the impact or jeopardy could be
forecast through extrapolation, considering what might happen to the public
policy if many employers terminated employees for the reason at issue.
Although the issue is seldom discussed by courts, Professor Perritt frames the
inquiry in the jeopardy issue differently: "[D]ecide if the threat of dismissal
is likely in the future to discourage the employees from engaging in similar
conduct."268 However, that seems too broad an inquiry because, as Perritt
acknowledges, the answer to that question will almost always be "yes."2 69
Perhaps no decision is a better exemplar of the difficulties courts face in
identifying a public policy that is jeopardized by a termination than the
Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital.270 In that case, an employee who refused to participate in a skit that
involved "mooning" the audience while singing the song Moon River was
fired.27' The court, while disclaiming any expertise in the techniques of
mooning,272 observed that the legislature passed a statute declaring indecent
exposure to be a crime.273 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was
"compelled to conclude that termination of employment for refusal to

263. A conspicuous example of this is the Arizona legislature's enacting the Arizona Employment
Protection Act in response to the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Wagenseller,discussed below. See
infra notes 270-277.
264. The all-or-nothing approaches are adopting a good-cause rule, which abolishes employment at
will, and strictly adhering to employment at will. Schwab, supra note 17, at 1944.
265.

Schwab, supranote 17, at 1944.

266. See Callahan,supra note 220, at 494 (stating that this element "is seldom assessed by the
courts").

267.

Id. at 493 n.57.

268.

Perritt, supra note 159, at 408.

269.

Id.

270.
271.
272.
273.

710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc), supersededby state statute,Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1035 n.5.
Id. at 1035.

§ 23-1501.
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participate in public exposure of one's buttocks is a termination contrary to
the policy of this state." 2 7 4
While the discharge in Wagensellermay have been a bad or an abusive
discharge for which relief should have been granted, the idea that it violated
and jeopardized a well-defined public policy seems quite far-fetched. First,
should the court have found implicated by the facts a public policy in a
criminal statute on indecent exposure? Although the connection certainly
could be made, it seems tenuous. Second, the question of impact or jeopardy
is even more troublesome, and the court did not discuss it. Would anyone
predict that the state of Arizona would be beset with incidents of indecent
exposure if the court denied recovery in the case? One could respond that the
question calls for an extrapolation, and if many employers fired employees
for refusing to moon others, then there could be a rash of indecent exposures.
However, this whole scenario sounds preposterous. Professor Schwab offers
Wagenseller as evidence that courts' demands that employees show a
violation of a public policy manifested in a specific statute can become
comical, calling Wagenseller "an example of such silliness."2 7 5
Wagenseller also demonstrates the "Catch 22" in which the searches for
public policy ensnare courts. It seems likely that most courts follow a narrow
approach and look to constitutions and statutes as sources of public policy so
that they will not be seen as usurping the role of the legislature in declaring
public policy. 276 Nonetheless, even if a court tethers its declaration of public
policy to statutes, as the court did in Wagenseller, if a legislature deems a
court's proclamation of public policy to be overreaching, the anchor of a
statute may not provide sufficient cover. The Arizona legislature was so
concerned with the court's decision in Wagenseller that it enacted the
Arizona Employment Protection Act to rein in the court and preserve a strong
at-will doctrine.27 7 Indeed, the concern with invading the province of the
legislature is the very reason articulated by New York courts for not
recognizing the tort of WDVPP at all.2 78
The other dilemma presented by courts' insistence on relying on statutes
for public policy is the issue of whether a statute creates a private right of
action. Most of the statutes relied upon do not expressly create a right of
action. If they did, plaintiffs would be bringing statutory claims under the
statutes. Thus, courts are being asked to permit a tort claim based on a public
policy ostensibly manifested in a statute that does not clearly provide a right
274. Id.
275. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1959.
276. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1958; Peck, supranote 11, at 744.
277. See Jones,supra note 147, at 1140; Clevenger, supra note 148, at 608.
278. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992); Murphy v. American Homer
Prods., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983).
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to sue. A court doing this can be criticized for legislating from the
bench 279 -essentially the same criticism drawn by courts going beyond
constitutions and statutes to identify public policy. Thus, if the courts go
beyond statutes to identify public policy, they may be seen as invading the
province of the legislature, and if they insist on statutes as sources, they may
be seen in the same way.
The courts also express reluctance to adopt expansive approaches to
identifying public policy because the more expansive approach carves out a
larger exception to employment at will and, at the extreme, approaches a
good-cause standard in place of at will.280
B. The Enigmatic Tort of WDVPP: Rationalizingthe JudicialDecisions
and/orReforming the Tort
There have been many attempts to provide a rationale for the analysis
and results in the decisions. Why did Ms. Green lose? Why did Ms.
Wagenseller win? What is really going on when a court finds that a public
policy is or is not violated by an individual termination?
Considering the array of court decisions, several commentators find the
public policy rationale of the tort dubious or, at least, not an adequate
explanation of the decisions. Professor Peck concedes that the question of
violation or conflict with public policy is considered by the courts, but he
suggests that the public policy rationale is in part a fagade or "camouflage"
for courts that believe employees and society are deserving of job
protection.28 ' As he evaluates the decisions, he posits that the otherwise
unexplainable variations in the results reflect different judicial beliefs about
the extent to which courts should provide such protection and/or different
levels of comfort with the cover provided by the public policy rationale
against the charge that judges are legislating from the bench a just-cause
principle for termination.2 82 Professor Cavico agrees that the public policy
rationale is subordinate to the goal of reining in the "'lawless' doctrine of
employment at will "which sanctions conduct inimical to societal welfare."283
Professor Schwab does not attempt to undermine the public policy rationale,
but he explains that the public/private distinction is a largely chimerical line,
and even private disputes between employers and employees have an element

279. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1961 (stating that courts allowing a tort claim "can be
viewed as supplementing whatever remedies or penalties the legislature has expressly provided in enacting
the statute").
280. See, e.g., Perritt,supra note 159, at 404-07.
281.

Peck, supra note 11, at 749.

282.

Id.

283.

Cavico, supra note 141, at 504.
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of public interest.284 Schwab posits that a rationale that better explains the
results in WDVPP decisions is that courts are trying to determine whether the
discharges have effects on third parties beyond the employer-employee
relationship.285 The Restatement ofEmployment Law also embraces the thirdparty effects rationale.2 86
Considering the cogent analyses of Peck, Cavico, Schwab, and others, I
conclude that the jeopardy posed to public policy by a termination is indeed
relevant to courts' WDVPP applications, analyses, and decisions.
Nonetheless, that consideration alone does not fully or adequately explain
what courts are doing with the tort. If public policy is understood in a much
broader sense, the explanation may be apt. For example, courts could
conclude that abusive terminations that are motivated by attempts to invade
and restrict personal freedoms of employees violate public policy, as
Professor Blades proposed.2 87 Professor Parker also proposed a broad and
innovative concept of public policy based on the enforceability of contract
terms.2 88 Instead, I will diverge from the WDVPP rationale further by
proposing that violation of general or specific public policy be a major
consideration, but not the sole litmus test, for a tort theory of recovery.
Several commentators have suggested that, given the problems with the
tort and the dubious rationale for its existence, reforms are needed. Some
commentators think that the answer is to move to a statute that restricts
employment at will.289 Others have called upon courts to abrogate
employment at will by announcing some version of a good-cause requirement
for discharge.290 Still others have called for reform of the tort remedy. An
innovative proposal by Professor Parker called for keeping the tort of
WDVPP but changing the definition and scope of public policy: public policy
would be violated and tort liability would be imposed if a court would not
enforce a reason for termination if it had been stated in a contract.29

284.

Schwab, supranote 17, at 1977-78.

285.

Id. at 1978.

286. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt a (2015) ("A principal justification for this
public-policy cause of action is that, regardless of the terms of the employment, certain discharges that
contravene well-established norms of public policy harm not only the specific employee but also third
parties and society as a whole").
287.

Blades, supra note 12, at 1406-07.

288.

Parker, supra note 20, at 402-05.

289.

See, e.g., Perritt,supra note 159, at 427-30.
See, e.g., Peck, supranote I1, at 773; Cavico, supra note 141, 531-32; Leonard, supranote 47,

290.

at 673, 680-83.
291. Parker, supra note 20, at 402-05. Parker's proposal is somewhat similar to Professor Schwab's
third-party effects theory. Schwab posited that courts would refuse to enforce a contract term by which
the parties agree to further their own interests and ignore deleterious effects on third parties. Schwab,
supra note 17, at 1952-53..
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My proposal calls for a reformed tort theory of recovery with principles
drawn from existing tort theories. Before turning to that proposal, however,
I consider the application of IIED to terminations because that theory of
recovery is the other tort theory relevant to my proposal.
C. IIED: Terminations That Civilized Society Will Not Tolerate
IIED is not a tort that was designed for employment law or terminations,
as was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The tort emerged
from efforts to unleash parasitic damages for emotional distress from other
torts. Before the recognition of the freestanding tort of IIED, emotional
distress damages could be recovered only if some other damage could be
established under some existing tort theory.292 The work of academics,
including Professors William Prosser and Calvin Magruder,29 3 and the
enshrinement of RED in the Restatement (Second) of Torts294 prompted

courts' recognition of IIED or the tort of outrage. IED is now officially
recognized in all but two states, and the highest courts of those states seem
receptive to recognizing the tort under appropriate facts.295
IIED is perhaps the most nebulous of all intentional torts,296 requiring
"extreme and outrageous conduct" that "goes beyond the bounds of human
decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in a civilized
292.

See, e.g., Russell Fraker, Note, Reformulating Outrage:A CriticalAnalysis of the Problematic

Tort oflIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2008).
293. See, e.g., Gergen,supra note 21, at 1705 (discussing the work of Prosser and Magruder); Martha
Chamallas, DiscriminationandOutrage: The Migrationfrom Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 2115, 2151 (2007) (describing TIED as "a tort created by academics" and citing the work ofProsser
and Magruder); see also Duffy, supra note 170, at 393 n. 17 (recognizing role of academic advocacy in
recognition of the tort and citing several influential law journal articles).
294. Chamallas, supra note 292, at 2151 (citing the recognition of lIED as a separate tort in the
Restatement (Second) as the "official birth" of the tort).
295. In 1994, Professor Dennis Duffy stated that only Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania did not
recognize the tort. See Duffy, supra note 170, at 390 n.7. Since that time, Montana has recognized the tort.

See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995). The Michigan Supreme Court
has never officially recognized IIED, but has suggested that it might under an appropriate set offacts. See

Hubbard v. Prison Health Servs., No. 10-14390, 2011 WL 4373981 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2011) (citing
Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985)). Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has never recognized the tort, but it has indicated receptiveness to the Restatement (Second) elements as
the minimum requirements. See Wilson v. American General Finance Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302-03

(W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 754 A.2d 650,653 (Pa. 2000)). In a dissenting
opinion, a Michigan Supreme Court justice noted that only two states' highest courts have not definitively

recognized IIED. Melson v. Botas, 863 N.W.2d 674, 674 (Mich. 2015) (Markman, J, dissenting).
296. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort ofIntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress in the Private
Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 116-17 (2003) [hereinafter Cavico, The Tort of
IntentionalInfliction] (discussing that "outrageousness" lacks a specific definition); Gergen, supra note
21, at 1695 (stating that what employers fear about IIED is the unknown and describing IED as one of
the formless torts); Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 SETON HALL

L. REV. 55, 60 (2012) ("[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to state with precision what actions qualify as
extreme and outrageous").
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community." 2 97 Nonetheless, it has been a largely unavailing theory for
plaintiffs generally. 298 Indeed, the Restatement (Second), while giving its
imprimatur to the tort, bestowed the initial weakness that it still bears:
"Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some
degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living
among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so
severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 299 Thus, IIED
is paradoxically one of the potentially most broadly applicable torts and a tort
theory that courts have been most reluctant to apply broadly.3 00
As difficult as it has been for plaintiffs generally to recover for IED,
plaintiffs in employment cases, particularly those involving terminations,
1
have found courts particularly reluctant to permit recovery.30 As with
WDVPP, courts fear permitting a substantial tort incursion on employment
at will.302 Some courts adopting such a restrictive approach to IIED have cited
a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "The actor is never
liable .. . where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain
to cause emotional distress."303 Believing that employment at will is a
sacrosanct principle of law, some courts fear that permitting recovery for one

297.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 46

cmt.

d (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
298. See Fraker,supranote 292, at 984 & 996 (describing it as a disfavored cause of action and "the
tort of last resort"); Long, supra note 296, at 56 (quipping that IED is "predictable in the sense that most

plaintiffs lose").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j. (1965).
300. See Chamallas,supranote 292, at 2117 (noting that IIED represents both "expansive protection"
of tort law and courts' "considerable reluctance ... to intrude upon other areas of law").
301. See, e.g., Gergen,supra note 21, at 1695-96.
302. In 1994, Professor Duffy declared that "the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions either do
not recognize the tort in the employment at will context, or place severe restrictions on liability in that
context." Duffy, supra note 170, at 391; see also Gergen, supra note 21, at 1702 ("Despite the apparent
openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees rarely succeed."); Cavico, The Tort ofIntentional
Infliction, supra note 296, at 157-58 (describing reluctance of courts to permit IIED to be used as a
backdoor wrongful discharge claim). Although there has been some expansion of application of IIED to
terminations in some states since Duffy's statement, there is still considerable reluctance on the part of
299.

courts.
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (2012) ("An actor can intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional
harm while exercising a legal right. For example, a spouse who seeks a divorce or an employer who
terminates an at-will employee might be substantially certain that the conduct will cause severe emotional
harm, but neither is liable for that conduct Otherwise, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm
would undermine well-established principles of marital law and employment law."); Chamallas, supra
note 292, at 2117 (describing "a considerable reluctance on the part of courts to intrude upon other areas
of law or to interfere with what is perceived to be an exercise of the defendant's legal rights"); Gergen,
supra note 21, at 1706 (explaining that ITED was not vexing until cases presented the question "whether
liability might exist for conduct that is privileged or immunized under another body of law").

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

110

Vol.41:1

termination case under IED will open the floodgates and jeopardize
employment at will."*
The Texas courts are representative of the restrictive approach to IIED
applied to workplace claims and terminations, and plaintiffs asserting IIED
claims for workplace incidents have lost most such cases.30 s The Texas
Supreme Court explained this approach in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce:306
"[T]o properly manage its business, an employer must be able to supervise,
review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees. Although many
of these acts are necessarily unpleasant for the employee, an employer must
have latitude to exercise these rights in a permissible way, even though
emotional distress results."307 The court in GTE Southwest cited numerous
Texas cases following the restrictive approach.30 8 Yet, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs on an lIED claim, given the
supervisor's "repeated" and "ongoing harassment" of his subordinate
employees.30 9 GTE Southwest was not a termination case, but it did slightly
liberalize the standard for outrageous conduct in Texas in the workplace
setting. Yet, the principle that courts should rarely permit a successful IIED
claim for employment termination remains vibrant in Texas case law after
GTE Southwest."o The idea that a termination, even if not executed as well
as might be hoped, is not outrageous because of employment at will persists
in all states." Discharged employees are almost never going to recover for

IIED.312
On the other hand, the Restatement (Third) takes the position that just
because one is exercising a legal right, "the actor is not immunized from

304. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992)
(finding "there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine" if the court permitted recovery

under IIED).
305. See Duffy, supra note 170, at 404-11; Gergen, supra note 21, at 1728-30; Cavico, The Tort of
Intentional Infliction, supra note 296, at 120-22.

306.

998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).

307.

Id. at 612.

308.

Id.at611-13.

309.

Id. at 616.

310. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. 2000); Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.
v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998); Gergen, supranote 21, at 1703 (stating, before GTE Southwest
was decided, that "conduct which normally or naturally occurs in a termination cannot be considered
morally outrageous as a matter of law").

311.

See, e.g., Winters v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., No. CV075012082S, 2008 WL 803134

(Conn. 2008) (finding that "while [employer's] method of terminating the plaintiff may have been a
callous, insensitive and unjustifiable course ofconduct, a jury could not find that it was "'so extreme and
outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency in a civilized community'); Harris v. Ark. Book,

Co., 700 S.W.2d 41,43 (Ark. 1985); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1274
(Idaho 2012); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ill. 1986).
312.

See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1976 (stating that scholarly commentary "has recognized

that employees rarely can win emotional distress claims").
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liability if the conduct goes so far beyond what is necessary to exercise the
right that it is extreme and outrageous." 3 13 Thus, a discharge carried out in a
humiliating way may satisfy the standard of outrageous conduct.314
VI. A REFASHIONED TORT: ABUSIVE DISCHARGE
A. The Tort
As certainly as American law has embraced employment at will as the
foundational and default rule for employment terminations, it is clear that
there are terminations that are so unfair that our society will not countenance
them without providing legal recourse.' The fundamental notion that there
are some "bad motive" terminations that will not be tolerated by the law is
based on widely shared moral commitments,"'6 and is well established
alongside employment at will. The statutory bad-motive exceptions to
employment at will have expanded since the 1960s;"' thus, it is clear that the
bad-motive terminations that society is unwilling to accept without redress
have been expanding.
As the statutory exceptions to employment at will expanded, we
experienced an expansion of common law exceptions for a period of years
followed by contraction. Yet, the common law exceptions persist, and
WDVPP continues to be recognized in over eighty percent of the states.318 I
think that common law exceptions play a vital and indispensable role in
employment law in the United States." The common law exceptions are
needed because the statutes clearly do not cover all terminations that our
society finds intolerable.320 The common law exceptions also are needed so
that discharged employees are not given the perverse incentive of trying to
force their claims under statutes that do not really fit their circumstances.
Furthermore, the common law exceptions sometimes are the precursors to
statutory exceptions, as legislators seldom write employment laws on a blank
slate.
313.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§ 46 cmt.

e. (AM. LAW INST. 2012).

314. Id. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
315. See, e.g., Donald C. Carroll, At-Will Employment: The Arc of Justice Bends Towards the
Doctrine'sRejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 655 (2012).
316. Estlund, supra note 47, at 1664.
317. Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352,
of enactment).

§ 716,

78 Stat. 241, 266 (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date

318.
319.

See supra note 219.
See supra Part IV.A.

320.

See Leonard,supranote 47, at 648 ("Tort exceptions reflect a concern that unbridled operation

of an at will presumption may undermine important public policies ... or that it may encourage behavior
inconsistent with current community standards of civility and respect for human dignity.").
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Now, some thirty years after the great assault on employment at will
subsided around 1990, it is time to expand the common law exceptions again.
This is so because the common law exceptions have fallen into such disrepair
since the innovations of the 1970s/1980s. This time, however, rather than
courts developing a variety of contract and tort theories, they can engage in
a more focused effort based on the results of the earlier period. As discussed
above, contract law is not a body of common law conducive to developing
effective exceptions to employment at will.32 ' Instead, tort law has the
potential to provide an effective common law theory of recovery for abusive
terminations. In 1996 Professor Gergen defended the role of the "collateral
torts" (IIED and others) applied to terminations as essentially patrolling the
outer perimeter of employment law and providing recovery in only the most
egregious cases.3 2 2 There is still a need for this last guardian against abusive
discharges-one that is not constrained by the specifics of statutory language
and one that can express the disapproval of society based on shared values
on a case-by-case basis.
I once argued for a more vigorous and expansive application of IIED to
discharges, with courts finding the standard of "outrage" satisfied if the
discharge was on the periphery of a violation of employment discrimination
law,3 23 such as terminations involving issues of sex and/or appearance. I now
acknowledge that IIED cannot be reconceptualized and repurposed to address
abusive terminations. The large body of case law finding that discharges are
not outrageous because employers are exercising their lawful right is too
powerful to overcome and is supported by the comments to the torts
Restatements.32 4

I now think that courts should abandon the tort theories that have been
ineffective, amorphous, and vexing. They should declare that recovery will
not be permitted under IED and WDVPP for employment terminations.
What is needed and supported by the development and evolution of the law
is essentially a fusing of the two torts of WDVPP and WED into the

321.

See supra Part IV.B.
322. Gergen, supra note 21, at 1699 n.17. Professor Givelber views the tort of IED as providing a
vehicle for dealing with the occasional hard case where enforcement of the normal legal rules or principles
produces a result that seems terribly wrong. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum SocialDecency and
the Limits ofEvenhandedness: IntentionalInfliction ofEmotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
CoLUM. L. REV. 42, 75 (1982).
323. See Corbett,An OutrageousResponse, supra note 31.
324.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (TItRD) OF

TORTS § 46 cmt. e (2012).
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refashioned32 5 tort of abusive discharge.32 6 I respectfully take the name for the
tort proposed by Professor Blades. I think the tort I propose is close to what
he envisioned, although perhaps broader.
Professor Peck has explained the WDVPP decisions in part as the courts
providing the job security to which they believe employees are entitled and
which society deserves.3 27 Because courts are called upon to second guess
business judgments of employers,3 28 they feel most secure doing this under
the guise or camouflage of public policy, and they feel least comfortable
3 29
doing so when they find discharges for socially reprehensible reasons. The
result is the enigmatic tort of WDVPP. Courts should stop this charade. They
are not just protecting the public from an employer threatening public policy;
they are second guessing employers on termination decisions.
Notwithstanding the employment-at-will doctrine, that is a proper role for
courts applying tort law. Employment at will is, in most states, common law
doctrine.330 Moreover, it is best described as a rebuttable presumption about
the employment contract. Employment at will should not control tort
doctrine, and courts are fully competent to interpret and modify common law
doctrine."' Indeed, is remarkable that a "mere" rebuttable presumption and
default rule of contract law has impacted the development of tort law so
substantially. Courts should recognize that this is neither necessary nor
appropriate.
Tort law is about imposition and enforcement of duties that reflect
societal values. Courts should unabashedly address the question of whether
a particular termination is one that should not be tolerated by society. A
fusing of the torts of IED and WDVPP would equip them to do this candidly
without the disguise afforded by the public policy rationale of WDVPP.
Professor Gergen argued that the outrage standard "allows new moral values
325. Mindful of the admonition of Professor Bernstein about the three paradoxes that stand in
opposition to the success of new torts (novelty, torts, and agency), I submit that I am not proposing a new
tort, but instead fusing two existing torts and making sense of the case law and doctrine for those torts.
See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 1544.
326. As discussed above, "wrongful discharge" would not serve well because the tort would be
burdened with the legacy and baggage of the tort of WDVPP. See supra Part V.A.
Peck, supranote 11, at 749.
328. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways. Redressing the
IncreasingIncoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITr. L. REv. 295, 300 (2005) ("[C]ourts do not
show the uniform fealty to employment at will that they profess").
327.

Id.
330. The courts would have a harder task in states in which there is some statutory basis for
employment at will, such as Louisiana, Georgia, and Arizona.
331. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 638-39 ("We expect the state courts to play this role in
dealing with private disputes: to identify principles which are congruent with the reasonable expectations
of the parties and the society in which they interact, building on existing bodies of precedent and theory.");
Parker, supra note 20, at 401-02 (arguing that judges should begin to ascertain public policy "to further
the goals of integrating tort and employment principles").
329.

114

BERKELEY JOURNAL OFEAPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 41:1

to be woven into the fabric of the common law."332 However, as discussed
above, courts have rendered the "outrage" standard of IIED beyond the reach
of almost any employment termination. Nonetheless, the tort of IED still
may have something to offer. A variation on the standard is included in the
Restatements' comments: conduct that is "intolerable in a civilized
community."" That iteration comes closer to the mark of the standard that
courts should apply for abusive discharge.
For the tort of abusive discharge, there should be only two elements:
proof of a discharge3 34 and evaluation of abusiveness, meaning analysis of
whether the discharge should be tolerated by society ("tolerance standard").
It is appropriate that a court should apply a tort standard that is calibrated to
societal values. 3 I do not think that there should be a separate element of
justification, as in the elements-based approach to WDVPP, in which an
employer can provide an overriding justification to defeat liability.336 Instead,
an employer's argument ofjustification is appropriately considered under the
tolerance standard. The answer to the question whether society should
tolerate a termination should be resolved, as under many other tort standards,
by balancing of the relevant interests-interests of employer, employee, and
society. Professor Blades argued that society has an interest in protecting
employees from termination regarding matters that are not their employers'
business.337 As applied by most courts, the tort of WDVPP, with its rigid
insistence on jeopardy to public policy manifested in statutes, has devalued
the interest of the employee and taken an unnecessarily cramped view of the
relationship between the employee's interest and the interest of society."
Under the proposed tolerance standard, in performing the balancing test,
courts could and should, in appropriate cases, take into account several
different considerations that various courts have considered in their decisions
evaluating terminations under WDVPP and IIED. For example, courts could
consider whether a public policy is implicated by the termination. Critiques

332.

Gergen, supra note 21, at 1709.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (1965).
334. As explained above, I do not propose extending the tort to adverse employment actions other
than terminations. See supra note 36. However, I do propose that constructive discharge satisfies this
element. Most states that recognize WDVPP do permit claims for constructive discharge. See
RESTATEMENTOF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt. c (2015).
333.

335. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 648 ("Tort exceptions reflect a concern that unbridled
operation of an at will presumption may undermine important public policies ... or that it may encourage
behavior inconsistent with current community standards of civility and respect for human dignity").
336. See supra note 252.
337.

See Blades, supranote 12, at 1432-34.

338. Id. at 1410 (advocating for tort recovery "for the sake of providing specific justice for the
afflicted individual, deterring a practice which poses an increasingly serious threat to personal freedom
generally, or instilling into employers a general consciousness of and respect for the individuality of the
employee").
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of the case law under WDVPP, discussed above, do not reject or disparage
the idea that the courts were concerned with a public policy."' Instead, those
critiques posit that insistence on identification of a clear public policy and
jeopardy to that policy as the sine qua non of the tort theory fail to explain
the decisions. Courts should consider whether a public policy is implicated,
but this is only one consideration, and not dispositive, under the overarching
standard. Courts also should consider factors such as third-party effects,
which, as Professor Schwab points out, is an appropriate consideration for
tort law.340 Whether the reason for the termination would be enforceable if it
had been included as a term of an employment contract341 also could be
considered under the tolerance standard, as suggested directly by Parker and
indirectly by Schwab, both because it is relevant to employer and employee
interests and it helps in the evaluation of third-party effects.342 I think courts
also should evaluate whether a termination would be highly offensive to a
reasonable employer and employee. This standard is similar to that used for
the invasion of privacy tort of intrusion on seclusion.3 43 It also is similar to a
standard used under employment discrimination law to evaluate whether
conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment.3 44 The employer and
employee perspectives are appropriate considerations because both parties
have interests worthy of protection, which should be balanced along with the
interest of society. In a case such as Green v. Bryant,3 45 for example, a court
would conclude that a termination of a woman because she had been beaten
by a spouse or partner should not be tolerated by society by weighing the
interests of the employer, employee, and society, rather than requiring that a
specific public policy be jeopardized by the termination.
The tort of IED offers a factor that should be considered under the
tolerance standard. One of the markers of outrageous conduct under IED is
abuse by the tortfeasor of a position of authority over the tort victim.346 While
employers necessarily have a position of authority over employees whom
they discharge, whether the exercise of authority is intolerable by societal
standards may be considered in light of the characteristics of the employment
relationship and the degree of imbalance of power. For example, an employer

339.

See supraPart V.A.

340.

Schwab, supranote 17, at 1972-75.

Parker, supra note 20; see also Wieder v. Skala, discussed supra note 278.
342. I must admit some trepidation with incorporating references to contract law, given the many
ways that contract principles have been distorted by employment at will. See supra Part IV.B. Nonetheless,
the query seems relevant and it is supported by case law, such as the Wieder case. See Wieder, supranote
341.

278, at 107.

§ 652B (1977).

343.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

344.
345.

See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995), discussed supra Part V.

346.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46 cmt.

e. (1965).
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that terminates a managerial employee who has worked for the employer for
decades may leave the employee with few options for a comparable job. For
example, a California court considered the number of years of service and
level of accomplishment of the employee in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.347
The employee's service was considered in Pugh under an implied contract
theory. However, even California has backed away from the importance of
the employee's service as a factor in the contract analysis.34 8 Because the
relational contract theory349 has not flourished in employment law, I propose
that courts consider the characteristics of the relationship, such as longevity
and quality of service under tort law in determining whether a termination
should be tolerated by society. I think this factor is consistent with the
imbalance-of-power factor under IIED and Professor Green's relational tort
theory.350
In the courts, a weakness of IIED has been that courts often grant
summary judgments, preventing the question of whether conduct meets the
standard of outrage from reaching the jury.351 It also seems that a
disproportionate percentage of WDVPP claims are dismissed on summary
judgment, perhaps because courts consider it their province to determine
whether a public policy is implicated. Under the proposed tort of abusive
discharge, the tolerance standard calls for application of a standard of what
conduct is tolerated by society, and it is appropriate that it be resolved by the
fact finder, except in cases in which reasonable people could not disagree.
One situation in which public policy is implicated is when a termination
is on the periphery of being actionable under other employment laws. For
example, the Iowa Supreme Court did not permit a dental hygienist to recover
for sex discrimination when her employer fired her so that he would not try
to have an affair with her (and because his wife gave him an ultimatum) in
Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C.352 Although the Iowa court may have
been correct to deny recovery for sex discrimination, the case teetered on the
brink of being actionable as sex discrimination. The tort of abusive discharge
could provide recovery for cases in which a statute is arguably violated, but
the statute and case law thereunder do not have to be stretched to permit
recovery. Under the tort analysis of abusive discharge that I propose, I think
that a court should find that the termination in the Nelson case is one that
should not be tolerated by society. A public policy is implicated even if the

347.

171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). I am aware that the employee lost the case on

remand in Pugh. 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
348. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1105 (2000).
349.

See supranotes 192-193 and accompanying text.

350.

See supranote 28.

351.

See, e.g., Gergen,supra note 21, at 1694-95.

352.

834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013).
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sex discrimination is not established based on the doctrine developed in case
law under the statute. It seems likely that the termination would be highly
offensive to a reasonable employer and employee. Moreover, the potential
for third-party effects should be clear in a case bordering on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment. The recognition of hostile
environment claims and sexual harassment claims by persons who were not
targets of the alleged harasser's conduct353 indicate the law's concern with
third-party effects. In the balancing of interests that occurs under the
tolerance standard, the employee's and society's interests should outweigh
the employer's justification.
It is worth noting that, because employers increasingly have resorted to
requiring employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements,354 with the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court on the enforceability of such agreements,"'
many claims asserting this tort likely would be decided by arbitrators. There
is great concern among employee rights advocates about employees being
forced to arbitrate their employment claims.356 Research indicates that
employees do not fare as well in arbitration as employers do." This is not a
concern unique to this tort, as mandatory arbitration agreements typically
cover all claims arising out of employment disputes, including statutory
claims. However, the common law claim lacks the additional check on
employers that comes with a federal agency that can assert the statutory
claims in court that the employees themselves are precluded from asserting,
as the EEOC can do with federal employment discrimination claims. 5 With
fewer employment claims being litigated in the courts because of mandatory
arbitration, courts would have fewer opportunities to recognize abusive
discharge and to develop the doctrine than courts had in the 1970s and 1980s

353.

See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010).

354. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 133, at 23 (noting that employees in over 50% of American
workplaces are subject to mandatory arbitration); St. Antoine, ADR, supra note 156, at 414.

355. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
356. See generally St. Antoine, ADR, supra note 156, at 415-17; see, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm'n Notice No., 915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, Section V.B. (July 10, 1997),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html [https://perma.cc/9CHD-NB4A]. The EEOC, in a
divided vote, rescinded this position in December 2019. Erin Mulvaney, EEOC Rescinds Policy Against

Binding Arbitrationfor Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (Bloomberg) (Dec. 17, 2019).
357. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 133, at 22 (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch on
Employment Arbitration: ClarityAmidst the Sound andFury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 410

(2008)).
358. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002); EEOC v. Circuit City,
285 F.3d 404, 407 (6h Cir. 2002).
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when WDVPP was being adopted and developed.359 There are legislative
proposals at federal and state levels, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act,
introduced in Congress multiple times, including 2017360 and 2018,361 which
would render predispute mandatory agreements unenforceable. The tort that
I propose has a better chance of initial adoption and subsequent development
if employees are able to assert their claims in courts.
B. Objections to the Refashioned Tort
As with all proposals, there are many possible objections. I will address
what seem to me the most significant ones.
First, proponents of a strong employment at will doctrine will argue that
the standard under the proposed tort of abusive discharge is nebulous and will
substantially erode employment at will. On the other side, I think proponents
of statutory abrogation of employment at will are likely to argue that the
refashioned tort is an incremental change that would not result in a significant
increase in employee recoveries.
Addressing the anticipated objection of at-will advocates, first, the
tolerance standard that I propose is less amorphous than the standards and
analyses applied under IIED and WDVPP. It is a classic tort standard, which
applies a societal value and arrives at an answer by balancing the interests at
stake. It is more concrete than the outrage standard of IIED, it applies
specifically to terminations (unlike IED), and it strips away the camouflage
used by courts in WDVPP by articulating the considerations under the
standard. I admit that the tolerance standard is not objective and concrete,
and it is subject to varying interpretations and applications by judges and
juries. However, I think that I have fashioned a standard, from existing tort
and contract doctrine, that is better calibrated to the issue of employment
termination and is not dependent on what are often fictional connections to
public policy. Essentially, the standard declares that there are terminations
that are too bad for society to tolerate without the law providing a remedy.
This is an important declaration of protection for one of the most important
relationships that exits in American society, and I think it is consistent with
societal values. The merging of injury to relationships and a standard that
reflects societal values is an appropriate tort standard. If the uncertainty of
how the standard will be applied by any particular judge or jury in a case
gives employers pause in carrying out a termination, that is not a bad thing.
Given the significance of employment termination, employers should
359. Professor Colvin notes that employer use of mandatory arbitration agreements did not begin to
expand until the 1990s and 2000s after the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane

Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See Colvin, supra note 133, at 5-6.
360. H.R. 1374, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017-2018).
361. S. 2591, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2017-2018).
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consider the decision very carefully. Ifa termination is reasonably defensible,
this tort standard should not deter employer decisions. The extent to which
the refashioned tort would erode employment at will depends on the strength
of a state's adherence to employment at will.
Turning to likely objections by advocates of more drastic reform, I
already have discussed the history and limitations of statutes that abrogate
employment at will.36 2 Moreover, my proposal for common law tort
development does not preclude efforts to enact statutes. I admit that adoption
of the proposed tort would be incremental progress, but it is progress that is
worthwhile. The tort of abusive discharge would give courts an effective tool
with which to provide redress in the most egregious cases.363 In addition to
imposing a more substantial limitation on employment at will, I am proposing
a tort that I think aligns better with societal values and with the decisions
courts are reaching, or should be reaching, under ill-fitting tort theories. It is
important that the rationale articulated for recognition of tort theories of
liability and the case law actually decided be consistent. This has not been
the case for the tort of WDVPP. The tort of abusive discharge, as I have
described it, would call for courts to articulate the reasons that actually are
driving their decisions. Furthermore, if tort theories are worth maintaining,
then plaintiffs should have some prospect of recovery under them.
Terminated employees have almost never recovered for IIED. They have
recovered for WDVPP rarely and spasmodically, with many of the decisions
defying credible explanation under existing doctrine. This fused tort theory
seeks to address those infirmities in the law by peeling away the disguise of
public policy. Consideration of the factors described above makes clear that
courts actually are evaluating the termination decisions of employers.
Although this may be characterized as second guessing employer's business
judgment, the analysis that I have proposed makes clear that the decision is
being evaluated by taking into account the interests of all stakeholders that
are implicated in terminations-employers, employees, and society (the

public).
Finally, some will ask why I think courts, which have not been creative
and proactive in employment law since about 1990, would recognize this
reconceptualized tort. I have several responses. First, I propose what I think
the law should be, recognizing that I cannot make it so. Second, it seems
more likely to me that some state courts will consider and adopt the proposed
tort than it is that state legislatures will pass legislation abrogating
employment at will. Third, as a general matter, I think that some courts do
endeavor to understand and improve the law with which they work.
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120

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 41:1

Specifically, courts in some states have demonstrated a willingness to adopt
a more coherent and workable version of the WDVPP tort. Several
jurisdictions moved from the more common "pigeonhole" approach to the
elements-based approach."6 Finally, there were circumstances and forces that
converged in a two-decade or so period that caused courts to become active
and creative with the common law of employment. Perhaps that will happen
again on a smaller scale.
VII. CONCLUSION
The common law has an important role to play in employment law.
Professor Lawrence Blades saw the need for a tort of abusive discharge in
the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, courts engaged in a period of
vigorous development of the common law contract and tort theories used to
address termination from employment. That period ended around 1990, and
the courts since have retreated from many of the innovations in the common
law, thus restoring much of the strength of the employment at will doctrine.
From that period, however, emerged the most widely recognized common
law exception to employment at will: the tort of WDVPP. The tort, however,
is fraught with problems that render it nebulous and generally ineffective,
and the incoherent doctrine leads to decisions that are difficult to explain.
The prolific use of statutes to regulate employment has caused courts to relax
in the development and evolution of common law theories. Statutes,
however, have significant limitations. Moreover, common law developments
also play a role in prompting legislative action and providing the background
and education for enacting legislation. The time has come for courts once
again to become active, but this time in a more targeted way. Using existing
tort doctrine under IED and WDVPP, the courts should recognize a
refashioned tort of abusive discharge under which the dispositive issue is
whether society should tolerate a discharge. Recognition of such a tort, with
the benefit of over half a century of development since Professor Blades's
proposal, would help achieve his vision of an effective tort check on
employment at will and give the common law a larger role in protecting
society's interest in a vital attribute of citizenship.
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